The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

agent, they had to find a way to remove him. The best way would be to do it lawfully, usingthe domestic opposition. They could install someone else who was more reliable in hisplace. There were people in Kabul who could do it: KGB personnel, GRU operatives, and1,500 special forces operatives stationed at Bagram, who were waiting for the order. Butdeploying the Soviet Army would mean exposing it from all directions. That would not endwell. That would hurt.“Fine, I understand you, thank you,” Nikolai Vasilievich bid the generals farewell andremained alone. Now he had to go to a Politburo meeting again.Brezhnev himself was in charge of the meeting. When the head of the General Staffwas given the floor, he caught Ustinov’s glance, which didn’t promise anything good, as ifthe minister was warning him, “Don’t play with fire or you’ll be sorry.” Having suppressedhis anxiety, Nikolai Vasilievich narrated his arguments clearly and succinctly. He suggestedbringing small military units into Afghanistan to protect the most important sites as acompromise. The problem had to be resolved in a political rather than a military way.“Who gave you authority to speak of politics here?” demanded Andropov. “Youshould deal with fulfilling your own tasks. Leave the politics to us.”“But I am the head of the General Staff,” Ogarkov objected.“And not more than that,” Andropov snapped abruptly. “You were invited here notto share your opinion, but to hear the Politburo’s decision and fulfill it. The Politburo isleaning in a different direction, and you know it.”“Are there any other opinions?” asked Ogarkov, looking around the room.“To support Yuri Vladimirovich,” responded Suslov in his squeaky voice. Othermembers of the Politburo spoke after him, also in support of Andropov.677