The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

On August 20, Osadchiy invited Starostin to his office. At first, he shared a cable fromthe Center in which the leadership praised Starostin for the information that he receivedfrom the agent Kim, which illuminated covert activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups inthe Afghan army. Then, smiling cheerfully, the resident inquired about Starostin’s healthand his immediate operative plans. As the interlude was getting a bit long, Starostinrealized that the resident was positioning himself to raise some serious issue.Finally, Osadchiy told Starostin that one day ago, during a celebration of theIndependence Day of Afghanistan, one of the “clean” diplomats of the Soviet embassy wasapproached by Afghan Minister of Communications Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoiexpressed a wish for a confidential meeting with the Soviet ambassador. Gulabzoi askedSoviet comrades not to inform any Afghans about his request, under any circumstances.When Ambassador Puzanov was told about this request, he flat out refused to grant ameeting to Gulabzoi. Puzanov was correct. Why would a Soviet official representative, thehead of a diplomatic mission, jeopardize his ties with Taraki and Amin by setting up aconfidential meeting with a third party without clearing it with them first? However, theambassador invited Ivanov and Osadchiy and informed them of what had transpired. Bothintelligence officers immediately understood that Gulabzoi had an intention to deliver amessage about the split in the Khalqi top leadership to the Kremlin. Both officers saw aunique opportunity to finally find out about the details of the emerging situation in Khalq ifGulabzoi’s request was granted.Starostin understood that he was chosen to meet with the minister. “This will be theend of my work with the Chinese and Americans,” he thought without regret. The residentfinally addressed the purpose of the meeting.467