The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

position within the leadership of the country and the party even though he could noteliminate the “gang of four.” With the help of his nephew Asadullah, the same one who hadbeen mentored by the Soviet adviser Safronchuk, Amin recruited more allies from amongthe members of the Central Committee and heads of various prominent ministries. The pairfavored a certain method of appraising the loyalty of their potential allies: Asadullah wouldinvite a bureaucrat for a conversation and then directly ask whether he would supportAmin in his struggle against the opposition and the traitors. Meanwhile Asadullah satbehind a desk that had a loaded pistol lying on it in plain sight. If he sensed any hesitationin his interlocutor’s response, he would brandish the gun and threaten death orimprisonment. By that point very few people had any lingering doubts as to who was themost powerful man in Afghanistan.By the time he went to see Taraki on the day after his return, Amin had stoppedplaying the role of obedient “pupil.” The situation was clear to him. Either he would removethe rebellious Khalqis, or the Khalqis would remove him. However, as of two weeks ago theoutcome of the struggle was still uncertain. Having formed a secret pact of support withmost of the Central Committee’s members, Amin decided to take decisive action. Hedirectly demanded that the general secretary remove all four members from their positionsand indict them on charges of plotting against Amin and the revolution.He was well prepared for the conversation. While discussing the case of Sarwari,Amin began citing instances of the cruel and widespread crackdowns carried out by thesecurity services. He compared the AGSA to Daoud’s gendarmerie, to the brutal securityservices of the shah of Iran, and even to the CIA. He cursed while describing the dirtymethods practiced by Sarwari, and insisted that only Sarwari’s removal would clear the518