The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

arm and finance rebel groups. This means that we will face a unified effort in responseinstead of the current uncoordinated resistance. Finally, it seems to me that the Sovietarmy is not trained to fight in such mountainous terrain.”“Nobody gave you the right to speak on behalf of the whole Soviet army,” MarshalUstinov said sternly, lifting his head from the papers in front of him.“Dmitry Fedorovich, this opinion is based on my conversations with the Sovietofficers who were arriving to serve as military advisers from different military districts.None of them have any idea how to fight in the mountains. Nobody trained them for that.There are a number of reasons that appear significant to me. Military intervention inAfghanistan would require colossal expenditures. In addition, it is a dangerousmisjudgment to believe our troops will enter the country to form garrisons there. Thereality is that they will be engaged immediately in military action. This means losses amongour military contingent and among the population. It is inevitable. Therefore we ourselveswill create many new enemies in the region.”Ustinov again shot the senior military adviser a menacing stare. The other membersof the commission remained silent.“Is this all you have to report?” asked Brezhnev with a hint of irritation. “In that case,you’re free. Why don’t you have a cup of tea in the next room while we listen to the KGBrepresentative?”About an hour later, Marshal Ogarkov walked out of the meeting room. Gorelovaccompanied him to his car. The head of the General Staff was in a grim mood.“This is it, Lev. We’ve lost.”641