The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

consequences of the confrontation between Amin and Taraki.The Soviet leaders, who were unfamiliar with the cruel Pashtun traditions, werethinking approximately the following: “Well, they might send a couple of young ministersabroad as ambassadors. It won’t be too bad for them. They can broaden their worldviewand gain some experience and perspective. Besides, the switching of diplomatic posts is thedomestic affair of our Afghan friends and we shouldn’t interfere. Islamic extremists, whonever part with their weapons, pray five times a day, practice polygamy, and are not afraidof death because they think that those who are killed while fighting infidels are guaranteeda spot in heaven, are a different matter. Those are people who exist in a mysterious world,very different from ours. This is where a true threat to Afghanistan’s progress lies.”During the meeting with the Afghan leaders, Ponomaryov expressed the Sovietleadership’s deepest concern about the activation of counter-revolutionary activities byIslamic groups, particularly the growing influence of reactionary clerics in the Afghanarmed forces. His interlocutors confirmed that the threat was very serious and raised theissue of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Ponomaryov craftily avoideddiscussing the topic of Soviet military intervention and switched to the necessity ofexpanding the social base of the revolution by attracting the broadest groups of theworking population of the country, the natural allies of the PDPA. Further, they discussedthe work of party advisers who had been sent to Afghanistan by the Central Committee ofthe CPSU. The leaders of the DRA, to the great satisfaction of their Moscow guest, highlyvalued the activities of the party advisers, characterizing them as “carriers of the pricelesswisdom and experience of the Soviet communists, who provide a great assistance to thedevelopment of the party.”444