The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“This is what happened,” began Bogdanov. “In early May, when there were only twoof us in his office, Sarwari approached me very closely, so that nobody else could hear him,and very quietly said, ‘Amin is a very cunning, cruel, treacherous, and dangerous person. Heis able to do anything it takes to strengthen his personal power in the party and thegovernment.’ Sarwari said some other negative things about Amin, but I didn’t understandthem. It was all very unexpected. At first I thought that it was some kind of provocation—that he was checking out my reaction to such statements. Then I thought it was all said onbehalf of Taraki. Frankly speaking, I was very confused. When the interpreter walked intothe office, Sarwari moved back to his seat at the desk and, as if nothing happened, started todiscuss some insignificant, mundane issues.”“So you see, Leonid Pavlovich, your information about a serious discord among theKhalqi just received further confirmation,” said Ivanov. “Forgive me for interrupting you,Victor Andreyevich,” he turned to Bubnov. “Please continue.”In the second part of his report, Bubnov shared more intriguing information:“Minister of Defense Aslam Watanjar, who is a national hero of Afghanistan, is anotherenemy of Amin. Watanjar’s tank is now exhibited on a pedestal in front of the Ark. Watanjarlearned from one of Taraki’s aides-de-camp, a personal friend and former colleague, thatAmin persistently tries to convince Taraki to remove Watanjar from his position as theminister of defense. The arguments for firing him are simple: ‘The minister cannot doanything against the rising counter-revolutionary forces. The army is disintegrating.Uprisings are frequently occurring in military detachments. Many officers are siding withthe rebels. All of it is because Watanjar lacks an adequate military education, experience inparty leadership, and doesn’t pay enough attention to his work responsibilities, preferring434