The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

confusing Afghanistan with Switzerland.The sentence for Amin had been issued. That was clear to everybody. But whowould carry it out? Who would become the executioner? No one in that office dared to utterthe words that could destroy his future career.“Fine,” Bogdanov broke the silence. “Let's agree to do the following. I am leaving forKabul. During the meetings with both sides, I will express our current unwavering positionof support for the unity of the party and its leadership. If the opposition raises an issueabout Amin again, I will signal to them that the solution rests with them. The Soviet Unionwill not interfere in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan.”That was how the meeting was adjourned.A major conference dedicated to Afghan affairs had been conducted by Kryuchkovseveral days earlier. It was an interagency conference. Leaders of the First Chief Directoratewere joined by representatives of the GRU in Yasenevo. The GRU group was led by GeneralIvashutin, the head of Military Intelligence. Both agencies put forward very pessimisticanalyses of the situation. Kryuchkov, referring to the opinion of the special KGBrepresentative Ivanov, declared that Amin, with his intrigues, ambitions, andunpredictability, had become a direct threat to the socialist course of Afghanistan and toSoviet interests in the country.The GRU head cited numerous instances in which American positions in the regionwere being strengthened. According to Ivashutin, the only way to maintain control over thesituation was to initiate a Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.The room grew silent after that statement was made. All of the participants in that secretconference knew General Ivashutin well. They realized that he would never deliver such a511