The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“This is good. Please tell me, what is the United States’ reaction to the latest events inAfghanistan?” asked Gromyko, having in mind the takeover of power.“The media writes a lot about us, but we feel that the Americans have not yet made uptheir minds.”“Yes,” Gromyko mumbled, “we are also under the impression that the Americans arehesitating, that they cannot draw conclusions.”***It is true that the coup in Kabul came as a surprise to the United States and furthercomplicated an already complex situation. Declassified documents from the period reflectconfusion among diplomats and intelligence operatives. Although these documents (cablesfrom the embassy and analytical papers from special services) contain rathercomprehensive information about what transpired, they are very cautious in their analysesand even more careful in their prognoses. On September 17, Amstutz, referring to hisconversations with diplomats and well-informed Afghans, reported to the StateDepartment that “the Soviets are not terribly enthusiastic, but they realize that at this pointin time, there is no alternative to supporting the ambitious and cruel Amin…Now Amin isall they have left…He is the only weapon that will allow Russia to defend the ‘brotherlyparty’ and preserve the ‘progressive revolution.’”The next day, the charge d’affaires dared to issue a prognosis in a cable to the U.S.secretary of state. “The crisis is not over,” he wrote. “It is quite possible that a civil war ledby Taraki’s allies or other anti-Amin elements may begin between major militarydetachments of the DRA. Yesterday an Afghan official, in a conversation with an embassystaff member, confidentially called the leadership a ‘bunch of scorpions intent on delivering590