The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“So Taraki’s time is over?” asked Andropov thoughtfully.“Yes, Yuri Vladimirovich. He belongs to history now. But we cannot make peace inAmin’s presence. Even if he does not collaborate directly with the Americans, his actionswill damage the revolutionary process and the PDPA tremendously. He also jeopardizesour interests in Afghanistan.““Wait,” Andropov said. “This is what you and I think. But such decisions must bediscussed by our party’s Politburo. Are you sure that all Politburo members perceive Aminsimilarly?” Kryuchkov shrugged his shoulders. “I am not sure. As far as I know, the ministerof defense receives a very different interpretation of the events. Andrei AndreyevichGromyko will hesitate until the last moment. Ponomaryov? It’s possible that he has beendeluded by Amin’s pseudo-revolutionarism and attachment to Stalin’s methods of resolvingissues. So let’s not rush. My request for you is to collect the information and keep thesituation under unceasing control. Report every meaningful development immediately, andlet the CPSU’s recommendations guide all of your actions.”Kryuchkov knew about those recommendations. They stated that one should, “takethe real situation into consideration,” and not give up on dealing with Amin at this stage. Itwas simultaneously recommended to try to dissuade Amin from repressing the allies ofTaraki and other disloyal parties by all means. The instructions said that any contacts madewith the new leader should be used to clarify the details of his political persona andintentions. Military and other advisers were ordered to continue their work and avoidparticipating in crackdowns against those on Amin’s blacklist. The Soviet supply ofarmaments and military technology was to be “somewhat slowed down.” The mass mediawas to limit their publications to just the facts, without interpretation or comment.586