The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“Well, Volodya, it is time to act,” the chairman of the KGB looked at Kryuchkov.“Consider the order to have been issued. From now on everything, or most of it, depends onyou and your men.”Kryuchkov didn’t even consider asking Andropov more about the order. Where didit come from? Who signed it? How was it worded? Kryuchkov was so loyal to Andropovthat he would have fulfilled any of his orders without any doubt or discussion. Gratitude forhis successful career and sincere respect for Andropov (who unquestionably was a majorfigure), as well as old professional traditions according to which no unnecessary questionswere asked of the leadership, defined Kryuchkov’s attitude towards Andropov.Andropov’s words did not catch the chief of intelligence by surprise. Kryuchkovhimself was not particularly decisive or analytical. But years of serving in the bureaucraticapparatus had honed his ability to intuitively grasp his boss’s desires. He, in turn, was theperfect executor. In this case, the leadership’s wishes were obvious: Amin must be killed,someone loyal must be brought to power, and Afghanistan must remain a friend and ally. Alot had already been accomplished. Having been thoroughly instructed, Karmal, Sarwari,and other disgraced opposition leaders, who had been very eager to begin their battle,were transferred to Tashkent, closer to the border, from where they could arrive in Kabulwithin an hour or two once the signal was given. Then they would engage in fulfilling theirassigned tasks. In Kabul, Kryuchkov’s operatives worked closely with Parchamis in hidingand Khalqis in opposition. Major KGB and Army special forces, numbering over 1,500, wereconcentrated at the airbase in Bagram and in Kabul. A KGB operative had penetrated theclosest inner circle of the Afghan leader.680