The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“Our comrades, including the commander of the infantry, General Pavlovsky, reportthat the armed forces of the DRA are fully focused on deterring rebel attacks,” said Ustinovdryly. “They are engaged in constant battle. It is difficult to see whose side they would takein a potential conflict with Amin. According to our information, Amin has very goodstanding with the army. He cleaned out the officer corps in advance, and removedParchamis and other unreliable elements. I’m afraid that the problem may be more seriousthan we estimate. Most probably, we will not be able to resolve it without the directparticipation of our military.”“Are you suggesting, in other words, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan?”asked Gromyko. “We should realize the consequences that such a step would entail.”“I am not suggesting anything, yet,” responded stone-faced Ustinov. “I am onlystating the facts. Without our active support, the healthy elements will find it difficult togain the upper hand in the PDPA. If we agree to support the opposition, then we will surelyhave to engage every resource, from the KGB and our military. If we initiate this action, wehad better be prepared to secure a successful outcome.”“Dima is correct,” Brezhnev confirmed. “Failure for us is not an option. But Andreihas also voiced a useful perspective. We need to consider all of the consequences of suchactions. Of course it would be desirable to avoid Soviet military presence in Afghanistanand leave the situation in the hands of our Afghan comrades, but if such a plan isunrealistic, then let us prepare concrete suggestions in regards to a military interventionoption by our next meeting.”The Politburo members recognized that the general secretary was obviouslyfatigued, and quickly adjourned the meeting.633