The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

As a result, many members of the PDPA lost their ministerial and other highgovernment positions in 1974-1975. Some were sent abroad as ambassadors, while othersmerely became unemployed. The worst humiliation befell the active participants ofDaoud’s coup. The military pilot Abdul Qadir was removed from his position as thecommander of the air force and later received the degrading appointment of head of theAfghan army slaughterhouse. Soon after being demoted, Qadir began discussing a new,anti-Daoud coup d’etat with his close friends—officers. An Afghani man can tolerate andforgive a great deal, but not an assault on his dignity.The removal of the ministers—members of leftist organizations—bewilderedMoscow. Bureaucrats in the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee and the ForeignMinistry could only guess. It seemed that the International Department of the CentralCommittee had chosen the correct strategy towards the new Afghan regime. Sovietcomrades persistently urged leaders of both Khalq and Parcham, “to reduce theirrevolutionary ambitions and to support the progressive regime established in Afghanistanwith all means available to them.” The Soviet leaders did not want to question their ownstrategic vision, nor did they want to be disappointed in Daoud. Thus they decided not toget disappointed. Many of the high-ranking bureaucrats dealing with Soviet-Afghanrelations simply accepted Daoud’s rationale for replacing the high-level leftist cadres anddid not dwell too much on them. The explanation was that at that particular stage of theRepublican Revolution the country needed highly qualified managers rather than armyofficers trained only to shoot and march.At that time there were some young diplomats and intelligence operatives in Kabulwho were well informed about what was going on in Afghanistan. They knew that during17