The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

If facts indicating a change in Amin’s attitude towards the Soviet Union were toemerge, additional proposals regarding measures to be taken by the Soviet side should beintroduced.In essence, if it wasn’t an official death sentence, then it was a preamble to it. Thedocument set the stage for the final act of the tragedy of the “First Stage of the AprilRevolution in Afghanistan.”At the onset, it was imperative that the Soviet Union disguise its strategy for dealingwith Amin. The next day, the Soviet ambassador received instructions to inform Amin thatMoscow had received his request to visit the Soviet Union with understanding. The Sovietleaders would be prepared to receive Amin in order to exchange opinions about issues thatwere of interest to both sides in a friendly and business-like manner as soon as theopportunity arose.***Meanwhile, the tenure of General Pavlovsky and his group of operatives inAfghanistan had reached its end. In his reports to Moscow, the commander of the infantrycontinued his line of interpretation of events. He indicated that the situation in the armedforces of the DRA was quite stable, and that their military capacity would allow them tosuccessfully deter rebel assaults. He was aware that his interpretation was not wellreceived by Marshal Ustinov. The minister expressed his dissatisfaction over the phone onnumerous occasions, but Pavlovsky was one of those rare generals who put the truth (as hesaw it) above his career ambitions. He returned to Moscow on November 3, and began thewait for the summons to give a final report to the minister. To his surprise, the wait lastedtwo weeks. When the marshal finally made time to listen to his special representative, who636