The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

did not bother to learn, continued to grow as a result of these sessions.Amin often asked Generals Gorelov and Zaplatin, with an increasing sense of insult,for the reasons that their Soviet comrades in Moscow remained sympathetic to theParchamis instead of rejecting them outright, or, better yet, handing them over toAfghanistan’s security services in order that they be “tried.” On one occasion he broke intoa diatribe in an attempt to explain the irreconcilable divide between the two factions to hisSoviet friends.“Why, in your opinion, have the two factions done nothing but quarrel sinceestablishing the PDPA?” Amin asked the generals.“Different views regarding tactics and strategy,” Zaplatin replied cautiously.“Khalqis come from the lowest strata of society, while Parchamis represent the midandtop-level bourgeoisie and feudal circles,” Gorelov observed less diplomatically. “In myopinion, this is part of the larger issue of class divisions.”“All of this is correct,” said Amin, “but now allow me to name the main reason. I hopeyou will share this with your leadership and open the eyes of our comrades who stillblindly trust Karmal. The split in the party is a result of imperialist and feudal reaction.Parchamism was conceived artificially in the depths of our special services, the secretpolice, and military counterintelligence. Karmal and his allies are agents who wererecruited during the monarchical regime. I’m sure that their true bosses work far fromKabul, either in the United States or in Bonn.”The generals exchanged meaningful glances. Lev Nikolayevich remembered wellthat a high-level KGB official mentioned in passing at the banya that Karmal, Taraki, andAmin himself had all worked very closely with the KGB in the time leading up to the April349