The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

counterintelligence managed to neutralize them.At the same time, Kabul was visited by the Czechoslovakian Communist Party’sgovernment delegation, led by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party ofCzechoslovakia Vasil Bilyak. Taraki and Amin insisted on Karmal’s extradition during the meetingwith their guests. They threatened, “If you won’t extradite him, you are not our friends anylonger.” But Bilyak politely smiled in response. When the official part of the meeting was over andTaraki left, Amin told his guest, “If we manage to find Karmal, we will bring him to Afghanistanand shoot him as a CIA agent.” Bilyak, who had received firm instructions from Moscow regardingKarmal’s case, didn’t respond to Amin’s statement.Babrak became a big headache in the fall of 1978, not only for the Khalqis, but also forMoscow. On the one hand, as an experienced Afghani revolutionary and loyal, ideological warriorand trusted friend of the USSR, he should have been protected from the vengeance of his “partycomrades.” On the other hand, Moscow couldn’t give Taraki and Amin even the smallest reason forbeing unhappy. Those two personified the real and legal authority that demanded respect andsupport. Karmal, however, had no desire to sit quietly in exile. He received prominent Parchamisand discussed plans aimed at combating his enemies. Everything was becoming known to Kabulalmost immediately, as the Afghan Security Services watched the out-of-favor revolutionary veryclosely.Amin fully understood that Czechoslovakia had offered his adversary a shelter withMoscow’s agreement. This is why he wouldn’t miss an opportunity to chide his Soviet comrades:“Why are you covering up this plotter and CIA agent? He is conducting covert activities against ourregime, and you are assisting him?”Finally, KGB Resident Vilior Osadchiy wrote a cable to the Center. He insisted that Karmal190