The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

global revolutionary movement. That should have made the general secretary suspicious ofAmin’s hidden intentions, as Taraki was well aware that Amin would never miss anopportunity to be the star on the international stage or mingle with such extraordinarypersonalities as Fidel Castro. Yet all of the sudden Amin was trying to pass on such anopportunity to “his teacher.” However, Taraki had a soft spot for adulation, and thus he didnot sense anything suspicious.The KGB Residency in Kabul received Kryuchkov’s recommendation to talk Tarakiout of traveling to Cuba. The Center had reasons to believe that Amin might take advantageof Taraki’s prolonged absence from the country in order to seize power. Alas, Taraki didnot want to listen to those arguments. Moreover, he decided to use a Boeing jet, recentlyacquired from the Americans, for the flight to Havana. The Center got alarmed even moreas they thought about potential sabotage. KGB representatives in Kabul were ordered tomeet with Taraki once again and persuade him to use a specially allocated Sovietgovernment plane with a Soviet crew. After great difficulty, Taraki was finally persuaded.The Afghan delegation left for Cuba on August 30. Besides Taraki, the delegation consistedmostly of people who were close to Amin—Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Wali, theformer head of Tsarandoi and current head of the Secretariat of Head of State, Tarun,Commander of the Presidential Guard Jandad, and others. The delegation planned to makea stop in Moscow on their return. Therefore Amin instructed his men to hold confidentialmeetings with Soviet representatives and inform them that a group of prominent Khalqiswas preparing a plot against him.Amin seemed to be very well informed about the plans of the three ministers andSarwari. The issue was, who would strike first?500