The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

when he participated in a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Castro, according toAmin, received him cordially in Havana and allowed Amin to attend Politburo meetings.”Bogdanov stopped talking. He wanted Kryuchkov to internalize all of theinformation. The KGB representative in Kabul wanted to add one more note to Amin’sdescription, but was unsure how it would be received by Kryuchkov. The colonel knew hisboss’s character well, and also appreciated his own limitations, although he was verytempted to add that it seemed that both Amin and Taraki internalized the lessons of theGreat October Revolution and the first post-revolutionary years well. In particular, inprivate conversations with Soviet comrades, they had found excuses for their persecutionof Parchamis, recalling how severely Lenin and then Stalin had dealt with the Men’sheviks,Trotskyites, Zinovievists, and others whom they suspected of disloyalty. “Do your historybooks throw any shadow of a doubt on the righteousness of this strategy?” Amin hadcornered his Soviet comrades. “We have been taught by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians thatthe class struggle only grows more acute.” Bogdanov was going to say that Amin was actingin full accordance with Bolshevik tactics and strategies. First, he destroys the oppositionand its sympathizers. Then he most probably removes all of his closest allies and anyonewho might stand in the way of his personal rule, exactly like his idol Stalin had done. ButBogdanov hesitated to tell this to Kryuchkov. “Who knows how events will develop,” hethought. “It is possible that Amin will become a loyal partner of the Soviet Union for manyyears to come, like Fidel Castro. Perhaps the Kremlin is betting on him. Anything ispossible. This is why I should narrate only facts. If we make references to reports fromagents and trusted friends, that information should be thoroughly filtered.”243