The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

will have to report to them the results of these talks. Shall I tell them that the Soviet Unionwill provide the DRA with only political support and some other assistance?”“That’s correct,” confirmed Kosygin. “Political support as well as enormous militaryand other assistance. This is the decision of our Politburo. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev will tellyou about it when he meets with you in ten minutes.”***Foreign Ministry Adviser Gavrilov, who was writing the transcript of theconversation, praised Kozin. “Good for you,” he said. “You’ve done an excellent jobinterpreting.”Gavrilov was the right hand of the head of the Afghanistan Department in theministry. He had worked in Kabul for many years and had interpreted meetings with theking, as well as Daoud. Because of this, his praise meant a lot.“But,” he warned Kozin, “your main test is still ahead of you. I have been asked tofinalize this transcript, so you will have to both interpret and take notes for Taraki’sconversation with the general secretary. I wish you luck.”Leonid Ilyich received the Afghan guest in his Kremlin office. Taraki came alone.Taking into account the particular sensitivity of the situation and potential complicationsduring the talks, not even the Afghan ambassador was invited. However, no tense momentsoccurred during that meeting. Taraki acted with great dignity but avoided discussions withBrezhnev, while Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Ponomaryov mostly remained silent inBrezhnev’s presence, as was the practice at the time.The Soviet leader dutifully read aloud a memorandum that his assistants hadprepared. The memorandum included a number of recommendations that were formulated385