NASA Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports

20060002394 National Renewable Energy Lab., Golden, CO USA
Mechanisms of Growth of Nanocrystalline Silicon Deposited by Hot-Wire Chemical Vapor Deposition
Moutinho, H. R.; Jiang, C. S.; Xu, Y.; To, B.; Feb. 2005; 12 pp.; In English
Report No.(s): DE2005-15016400; NREL/CP-520-37345; No Copyright; Avail.: Department of Energy Information Bridge
We have studied the growth of silicon thin films by hot-wire chemical vapor deposition under different conditions of
filament temperature (Tf) and hydrogen dilution ratio (R). We found that these two parameters have a similar effect on the
properties of the deposited films and show how they interact to control the growth dynamics. For relatively low values of Tf
and/or R, the films are amorphous. An increase in the value of these parameters results in the appearance of a new phase,
characterized by heavily faulted (220)-oriented columnar grains; for even higher values, a randomly oriented nanocrystalline
phase appears. In general, there is more than one phase present in the film, and the microstructure varies as we go from the
bottom to the top of the film. Although Tf and R have similar effects on the physical properties, they affect the deposition rate
in a different way.
NTIS
Silicon; Thin Films; Vapor Deposition; Vapors
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ENGINEERING (GENERAL)
Includes general research topics related to engineering and applied physics, and particular areas of vacuum technology, industrial
engineering, cryogenics, and fire prevention. For specific topics in engineering see categories 32 through 39.
20060000051 Odyssey Research Associates, Inc., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Conclusions and Recommendations
Craigen, Dan; Validation, Verification and Certification of Embedded Systems; October 2005, pp. 7-1 - 7-5; In English; See
also 20060000049; Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A01, Hardcopy; Available from CASI on CD-ROM only as part of the entire
parent document
In this final section of the report we summarize our conclusions and recommendations. These points were formed during
the writing of the above sections, but were specifically formed during two days of meetings in Prague, The Czech Republic,
in October 2003. In general terms, we find that much of our discussion is not specific to embedded systems; the problems of
verification, validation and certification encompass many kinds of systems. We observe that trust, in itself, is a
sociological-technical matter; it is not attained wholly through technical means. In the Terms of Reference for the Task Group,
it is stated that the ’...Task Group is to review the techniques currently used in the software industry to product high quality
products; an appropriate number of methods and software life-cycle metrics for systems of relevant complexity should also
be examined, particularly those which are supported by fully operational environments. At the conclusion of this activity, the
Task Group should deliver a report addressing the following topics: Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance
of these techniques and methods to embedded military systems. Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these
methods. Assessment of current research trends in testing, formal methods, and requirements traceability. Specific
recommendations for military application of these techniques. and Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant,
such as Symposium or Workshop.’ For the rest of this section, we provide a summary discussion of each of the aforementioned
topics.
Derived from text
Certification; Software Engineering; Assessments; Requirements
20060000054 National Aerospace Lab., Amsterdam, Netherlands
Standards
Kesseler, Ernst; Validation, Verification and Certification of Embedded Systems; October 2005, pp. 5-1 - 5-9; In English; See
also 20060000049; Original contains color illustrations; Copyright; Avail.: CASI: A02, Hardcopy; Available from CASI
on CD-ROM only as part of the entire parent document
In air transport, the safety rules and regulations have evolved separately for the various services. Consequently for any
integrated system many, not necessarily harmonized standards apply. All discussed standards share the notion that software
has to be classified according to the system hazards the software failure would cause or contribute to. This information is
obtained from Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) plus (Preliminary) System Safety Assessment (P)SSA. Based on this
information, the software providing the service will be classified. For each class a number of standard specific requirements
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