THE SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE QUESTION OF KAZAKHSTAN’S HISTORY

THE QUESTION OF KAZAKHSTAN’S HISTORY 97
a solid military leader but one who was at times politically tactless.
See, for example, two interpretations of the rebellion that echo this
interpretation of the revolt, Zh. Kasymbaev, Kenesary Khan (Almaty,
1992) and Kh. Aubakirova, “Uchastie Sibirskogo Kazachestva v podavlenii
natsional’no-osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia Kazakhskogo naroda
pod predvoditel’stvom sultanov Sarzhana i Kenesary,” (Doctoral dissertation:
Eurasian University of Astana, 2000).
Although there has not been significant scholarly work conducted
by American or European scholars that examine the revolt in quite
the same way, two articles have debated the concept of “national-liberation”
and Kenesary. Bekmakhanov’s interpretations figure
prominently in both. 151
The Kenesary Kasymov Revolt was the turning point in the steppe
as Russia committed more men and resources to fighting Kenesary
than any other previous Kazakh rebellion. One element that made
Kenesary’s revolt unique was that at various times it extended to all
three hordes, attracting Kazakhs regardless of clan or horde to rally
to his cause. Indeed, the revolt was unique because at different times
during the revolt, according to the revolt’s most prominent historian,
Ermukhan Bekmakhanov, every clan allied with Kenesary. The problem
was that at no time during the revolt did all clans at the same time
ally with Kenesary. 152 Despite what might seem at first glance to suggest
that he marshaled huge numbers to his side, the best estimates
are that at the revolt’s peak (1844-1845) he could field between two
thousand to ten thousand “well-armed horsemen.” 153
In December 1838 Kenesary sent a letter to Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855)
that included four demands Russia must agree to before he lay down
his arms to end the rebellion. In the letter, Kenesary insisted that Russia
abandon the Aktau fort and destroy it. He further demanded that Russia
“destroy all other establishments in steppe locations,” to dismantle the
Akmolinsk Judicial tribunal (divan), and “free our imprisoned people.” 154
151 See Sabol, Steven, “Kazak Resistance to Russian Colonization: Interpreting the Kenesary
Kasymov Revolt, 1837-1847,” Central Asian Survey 22:2/3 (June-September 2003), 231-252;
Malikov, Yuriy, “The Kenesary Kasymov Rebellion (1837-1847): A National-Liberation Movement
or ‘a Protest of Restoration’?” Nationalities Papers 33:4 (December 2005), 569-597.
152 Bekmakhanov, Ermukhan, Kazakhstan v 20-40 gody XIX veka (Almaty: Kazakh Universiteti,
1992 [1947]), 170-173.
153 According to estimates by the Orenburg Frontier Commission, he could field two thousand
men. See TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4957, l. 11.; One of the first historians of the revolt, N. Sereda,
believed he had up to ten thousand “well-armed horsemen.” See Sereda, N. A., “Bunt
kirgizskogo sultana Kenesary Kasymova,” Vestnik Evropy, No. 8 (1870), 73.
154 TsGA RK, f. 374, op. 1, d. 25, ll. 15-16.