George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

The Kissinger networks in question can be summed up here under four headings.
Kissinger was at once British imperialist, Zionist, Soviet, and Red Chinese in his
orientation, all wrapped up in a parcel of greed, megalomania, and perversion. [fn 9]
Kissinger was one of the few persons in the world who still had anything to teach George
Bush in any of these categories.
The most essential level of Kissinger was the British one. This meant that US foreign
policy was to be guided by British imperial geoplitics, in particular the notion of the
balance of power: the United States must always ally with the second strongest land
power in the world (Red China) against the strongest land power (the USSR) in order to
preserve the balance of power. This was expressed in the 1971 -72 Nixon-Kissinger
opening to Peking, to which Bush would contribute from his UN post. The balance of
power, since it rules out a positive engagement for the economic progress of the
international community as a whole, has always been a recipe for new wars. Kissinger
was in constant contact with British foreign policy operatives like Sir Eric Roll of S.G.
Warburg in London, Lord Trend, Lord Victor Rothschild, the Barings bank, and others.
On May 10, 1982, in a speech entitled "Reflections on a Partnership" given at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London, Henry Kissinger openly
expounded his role and philosophy as a British agent of influence within the US
government during the Nixon and Ford years:
"The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal
American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign
nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American
bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union--indeed, they helped draft the key document.
In my White House incarnation then, I kept the British Foreign Office better informed
and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department.... In my
negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when
I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet- approved
document."
Kissinger was also careful to point out that the United States must support colonial and
neo-colonial strategies against the developing sector:
"Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onward believed that the United States, with its
`revolutionary' heritage, was the natural ally of people struggling against colonialism; we
could win the allegiance of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining
our European allies in the areas of their colonial dominance. Churchill, of course, resisted
these American pressures.... In this context, the experience of Suez is instructive.... Our
humiliation of Britain and France over Suez was a shattering blow to these countries' role
as world powers. It accelerated their shedding of international responsibilities, some of
the consequences of which we saw in succeeding decades when reality forced us to step
into their shoes--in the Persian Gulf, to take one notable example. Suez thus added
enormously to America's burdens."