George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

would call for a "two Chinas" policy, under which both Peking and Taipei would be
represented at the UN, at least in the General Assembly, despite the fact that this was an
alternative that both Chinese governments vehemently rejected. The US would pretend to
be fighting to keep Taipei in the UN, with George Bush leading the fake charge, but this
effort would be defeated. Then the Nixon Administration could claim that the vote in the
UN was beyond its control, comfortably resign itself to Peking in the Security Council,
and pursue the China card. What was called for was a cynical, duplicitious diplomatic
charade in which Bush would have the leading part.
This scenario was complicated by the rivalry between Secretary of State Rogers and NSC
boss Kissinger. Rogers was an old friend of Nixon, but it was of course Kissinger who
made foreign policy for Nixon and the rest of the government, and Kissinger who was
incomparably the greater evil. Between Rogers and Kissinger, Bush was unhesitatingly
on the side of Kissinger. In later Congressional testimony Ray Cline, a wheelhorse of the
Bush faction of the CIA, has tried to argue that Rogers and Bush were kept in the dark by
Nixon and Kissinger about the real nature of the US China policy. The implication is that
Bush's efforts to keep Taiwan at the UN were in good faith. According to Cline's fantastic
account, "Nixon and Kissinger actually 'undermined' the department's efforts in 1971 to
save Taiwan." [fn 10] Rogers may have believed that helping Taiwan was US policy, but
Bush did not. Cline's version of these events is an insult to the intelligence of any serious
person.
The Nixon era China card took shape during July, 1971 with Kissinger's "Operation
Marco Polo I," his secret first trip to Peking. Kissinger says in his memoirs that Bush was
considered a candidate to make this journey, along with David Bruce, Elloit Richardson,
Nelson Rockefeller, and Al Haig. [fn 11] Kissinger first journeyed to India, and then to
Pakistan. From there, with the help of Yahya Khan, Kissinger went on to Beijing for
meetings with Chou En-Lai and other Chinese officals. He returned by way of Paris,
where he met with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho at the Paris talks on Indo-
China. Returning to Washington, Kissinger briefed Nixon on his understanding with
Chou. On July 15, 1971 Nixon announced to a huge telvision and radio audience that he
had accepted "with pleasure" an invitation to visit China at some occasion before May of
1972. He lamely assured "old friends" (meaning Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC
government on Taiwan) that their interests would not be sacrificed. Later in he same year,
between October 16th and 26th, Kissinger undertook operation "Polo II," a second,
public visit with Chou in Peking to decide the details of Nixon's visit and hammer out
what was to become the US-PRC Shanghai Communique', the joint statement issued
during Nixon's stay. During this visit Chou cautioned Kissinger not to be disoriented by
the hostile Peking propaganda line against the US, manifestations of which were
everywhere to be seen. Anti-US slogans on the walls, said Chou, were meaningless, like
"firing an empty cannon." Nixon and Kissinger eventually journeyed to Peking in
February, 1972.
It was before this backdrop that Bush waged his farcical campaign to keep Taiwan in the
UN. The State Department had stated through the mouth of Rogers on August 2 that the
US would support the admission of Red China to the UN, but would oppose the