George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

November elections, he could unveil the full offensive buildup that would carry him into
war with Iraq. "That's why our defense of Saudi Arabia has to be our focus," Bush is
reported to have said at this meeting. This remark was calculated to cater to the views of
Gen. Powell, who was thinking primarily in these defensive terms. [fn 38] When the
larger NSC meeting dispersed, Bush met with a more restricted group including Quayle,
Sununu, Baker, Scowcroft, Cheney, Powell, and Webster. This session was dominated by
the fear that the Saudi Arabian monarchy, which would have to be coerced into
agreeement with plans for a US military buildup on its territory, would prefer a
compromise solution negotiated among the Arabs to the Anglo-Saxon war hysteria. The
Saudis were not all as staunch as the American agent Prince Bandar; the presence of large
contingents of infidel ground troops, including Jews and women, would create such
friction with Saudi society as to pose an insoluble political problem. There was great
racist vituperation of the Arabs in general: they could not be trusted, they were easy to
blackmail. This meeting produced a decision that Bush would call Saudi King Fahd and
demand that he accept a large US ground force contingent in addition to aircraft.
As Bush feared, Fahd was inclined to reject the US ground forces. There was a report that
Iraq had announced that its forces would leave Kuwait on Sunday, and Fahd wanted to
see if that happened. Fahd had not yet been won over to the doctrine of war at any cost.
Through an intrigue of Prince Bandar, who knew that this difficulty might arise, King
Fahd was prevailed upon to receive a US "briefing team" to illustrate the threat to him
and demand that he approve the US buildup on his territory. Fahd thought that all he was
getting were a few briefing officers. But Bush saw this as a wedge for greater things. "I
want to do this. I want to do it big time," Bush told Scowcroft. [fn 39] By now Bush had
launched into his "speed-dialing" mode, calling heads of state and government one after
the other, organizing for an economic embargo and a military confrontation with Iraq.
One important call was to Sheikh Jabir al Ahmed al Sabah, the degenerate Emir of
Kuwait, representative of a family who had been British assets since 1899 and Bush's
business partners since the days of Zapata Offshore in the late 1950's. Other calls went to
Turgut Oezal of Turkey, whom Bush pressed to cut off Iraq's use of oil pipelines across
his territory. Another call went to Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, who was also in
deep domestic political trouble, and who was inclined to join the Anglo-Saxon
mobilization. During the course of Saturday, White House officials began to spread a
deception story that Bush had been "surprised by the invasion this week and largely
unprepared to respond quickly," as the next day's New York Times alleged.
At 8 AM on Sunday morning, there was another meeting of the NSC at Camp David with
Bush, Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft, Powell and various aides. This time the talk was almost
exclusively devoted to military options. Bush designated Cheney for the Saudi mission,
and Cheney left Washington for Saudi Arabia in the middle of Sunday afternoon.
Bush now boarded a helicopter for the flight from Camp David back to the White House
south lawn. Up to this point, Bush was firmly committed to war in his own mind, and had
been acting on that decision in his secret councils of regime, but he had carefully avoided
making that decision clear in public. We are now approaching the moment when he
would do so. Let us contemplate George Bush's state of mind as he rode in his helicopter