George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

ecome expert in the memo formats and formal procedures. After the morning CPPG meeting,
North had begun to get interested in Grenada.... Shortly before 6:00 P.M., the participants began to
arrive: Vice President Bush, [Secretary of Defense Caspar] Weinberger, [Attorney General Edwin]
Meese, J[oint] C[hiefs of] S[taff] Chairman General Vessey, acting CIA Director McMahon,
[State Dept. officer Lawrence] Eagleburger, ... North and myself. We all went to the Situation
Room in the White House. President Reagan was travelling, as were [CIA Director] Bill Casey
and Jeane Kirkpatrick.... Vice President Bush sat in the president's chair.
Menges continued: ``... A factual update was the first order of business. Then the discussion
moved to the availability of military forces and how long it would take to ready them. The
objective, right from the beginning, was to plan a rescue [of American students detained on
Grenada] that would guarantee quick success, but with a minimum of casualties....'' ``The first
suggested presidential decision was to prepare for possible military action by shifting navy ships,
which were taking a marine unit to rotate forces in Lebanon, plus other naval units, toward
Grenada. ``Secrecy was imperative.... As part of this plan, there would be no change in the
schedule of the top man. President Reagan ... would travel to Augusta, Georgia, for a golf
weekend. Secretary of State Shultz would go too....'' Work now proceeded on detailed action
plans, under the guidance of the Vice President's Special Situation Group. ``Late Friday afternoon
[Oct. 21] ... the CPPG ... [met] in room 208.... Now the tone of our discussions had shifted from
whether we would act to how this could be accomplished.... ''[The] most secure means [were to]
be used to order U.S. ships to change course ... toward Grenada. Nevertheless, ABC news had
learned about this and was broadcasting it.''
Thus, the course of action decided upon without the President was ``leaked'' to the news
media, and became a fait-accompli. Menges's memo continues:
It pleased me to see that now our government was working as a team.... That evening Ollie North
and I worked together ... writing the background and decision memoranda. Early in the evening
[NSC officer Admiral John] Poindexter reviewed our first draft and made a few minor revisions.
Then the Grenada memoranda were sent to the President, Shultz and McFarlane at the golf course
in Georgia.... Shortly before 9:00 A.M. [Oct. 22], members of the foreign policy cabinet [sic!]
began arriving at the White House--all out of sight of reporters. The participants included
Weinberger, Vessey, and Fred Ikle from Defense; Eagleburger and Motley from State; McMahon
and an operations officer from CIA; and Poindexter, North and myself from NSC. Vice President
Bush chaired the Washington group. All participants were escorted to room 208, which many had
never seen before. The vice president sat at one end of the long table and Poindexter at the other,
with speaker phones positioned so that everyone could hear President Reagan, Shultz, and
McFarlane. The meeting began with an overview and an update.... There were animated
discussions.... The conclusion was that by early Tuesday, October 25, the United States and allied
forces would be in a position to initiate military action.... The only legal authority on Grenada was
the governor general, Sir Paul N. Scoon, ... a Grenadan citizen appointed by the British crown....
Ingeniously, he had smuggled out a request for external help in restoring law and order.... The
detailed hour-by-hour plan was circulated to everyone at the meeting. There was also a short
discussion of the War Powers Resolution, which requires the president to get approval of Congress
if he intends to deploy U.S. troops in combat for more than sixty days. There was little question
that U.S. combat forces would be out before that time.... The president had participated and asked
questions over the speaker phone; he made his decision. The U.S. would answer the call from our
Caribbean neighbors. We would assure the safety of our citizens.@s1@s 1
Clearly, there was no perceived need to follow the U.S. Constitution and leave the
question of whether to make war up to the Congress. After all, President Reagan had
concurred, from the golf course, with Acting President Bush's decision in the matter. And
the British nominee in the target country had requested Mr. Bush's help!