George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

In 1991, the Bush damage control line is that events relating to the 1980 "October
surprise" deal of the Reagan-Bush campaign with the Iranian Khomeini mullahs of Iran
to block the freeing of the US hostages are so remote in the past that nobody is interested
in them any more. But in 1973, Bush thought that events of 1960 were highly relevant to
Watergate.
Bellino labelled Bush's charges "absolutely false." "I categorically and unequivocally
deny that I have ever ordered, requested, directed, or participated in any electronic
surveillance whatsoever in connection with any political campaign," said Bellino. "By
attacking me on the basis of such false and malicious lies, Mr. Bush has attempted to
distract me from carrying out what I consider one of the most important assignments of
my life. I shall continue to exert all my efforts to ascertain the facts and the truth pertinent
to this investigation."
Here Bush was operating on several levels of reality at once. The implications of the
Russell-Leon interstices would be suspected only in retrospect. What appeared on the
surface was a loyal Republican mounting a diversionary attack in succor of his embattled
president. At deeper levels, the reality might be the reverse, the stiffing of Nixon in order
to defend the forces behind the break-in and the scandal.
Back in April, as the Ervin committee was preparing to go into action against the White
House, Bush had participated in the argument about whether the committee sessions
should be televised or not. Bush discussed this issue with Senators Baker and Brock, both
Republicans who wanted the hearings to be televised- in Baker's case, so that he could be
on television himself as the ranking Republican on the panel. Ehrlichmann, to whom
Bush reported in the White House, mindful of the obvious potential damage to the
administration, wanted the hearings not televised, not even public, but in executive
session with a sanitized transcript handed out later. So Bush, having no firm convictions
of his own, but always looking for his own advantage, told Ehrlichman he sympathized
with both sides of the argument, and was "sitting happily on the middle of the fence with
a picket sticking up my you know what. I'll see you." [fn 35] But Nixon's damage control
interest had been sacrificed by Bush's vacillating advocacy, and the devastating testimony
of figures like Dean and McCord would have its maximum impact.
Bush had talked in public about the Ervin committee during a visit to Seattle on June 29
in response to speculation that Nixon might be called to testify. Bush argued that the
presidency would be diminished if Nixon were to appear. Bush was adamant that Nixon
could not be subpoenaed and that he should not testify voluntarily. Shortly thereafter
Bush had demanded that the Ervin committee wrap up its proceedings to "end the
speculation" about Nixon's role in the coverup. "Let's get all the facts out, let's get the
whole thing over with, get all the people up there before the Watergate committee. I don't
believe John Dean's testimony." [fn 36]
Senator Sam Ervin placed Bush's intervention against Carmine Bellino in the context of
other diversionary efforts launched by the RNC. Ervin, along with Democratic Senators
Talmadge and Inouye were targetted by a campaign inspired by Bush's RNC which