George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

Before the day was out, "the orders started flooding out of the Oval Office. The president
had all of these diplomatic pieces in his head. The UN piece. The NATO piece. The
Middle east piece. He was meticulous, methodical, and personal," according to one
official. [fn 36]
The next morning was Friday, August 3, and Bush called another NSC meeting at the
White House. The establishment media like the New York Times were full of accounts of
how Iraq was allegedly massing troops along the southern border of Kuwait, about to
pounce on Saudi Arabia. Scowcroft, with Bush's approval, bludgeoned the doubters into a
discussion of war options. Bush ordered the CIA to prepare a plan to overthrow or
assassinate Saddam Hussein, and told Cheney, Powell, and Gen. Schwarzkopf to prepare
military options for the next day. Bush was opening the door to war slowly, so as to keep
all of his civilian and military advisers on board. Later on Friday, Prince Bandar, the
Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, met with Bush. According to one version,
Bush pledged his word of honor to Bandar that he would "see this through with you."
Bandar was widely reputed to be working for the CIA and other western intelligence
agencies. There were also reports that he had Ethiopian servants in the Saudi embassy in
Washington, near the Kennedy Center, who were chattel slaves according to United
Nations definitions.
When the time came in the afternoon to walk to his helicopter on the White House south
lawn for the short flight to the Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of
Maryland, Bush stopped at the microphones that were set up there, a procedure that
became a habit during the Gulf crisis. There was something about these moments of
entering and leaving the White House that heightened Bush's psychological instability;
the leaving and arriving rituals would often be the moments of some of his worst public
tantrums. At this point Bush was psyching himself up towards the fit that he would act
out on his Sunday afternoon return. But there was already no doubt that Bush's bellicosity
was rising by the hour. With Kuwait under occupation, he said, "the status quo is
unacceptable and further expansion" by Iraq "would be even more unacceptable." This
formulation already pointed to an advance into Kuwait. He also stressed Saud Arabia: "If
they ask for specific help-- it depends obviously on what it is-- I would be inclined to
help in any way we possibly can." [fn 37]
On Saturday morning, August 4, Bush met with his entourage in Camp David, present
Quayle, Cheney, Sununu, William Webster, Wolfowitz, Baker, Scowcroft, Powell,
Schwarzkopf, Fitzwater, and Richard Haas of the NSC staff. Military advisers, especially
Colin Powell, appear to have directed Bush's attention to the many problems associated
with military intervention. According to one version, Gen. Schwarzkopf estimated that it
would take 17 weeks to move a defensive, deterrent force of 250,000 troops into the
region, and between 8 and 12 months to assemble a ground force capable of driving the
Iraqi army out of Kuwait. For the duration of the crisis, the Army would remain the most
reluctant, while the Air Force, including Scowcroft, would be the most eager to open
hostilities. Bush sensed that he had to stress the defense of Saudi Arabia to keep all of his
bureaucratic players on board, and to garner enough public support to carry out the first
phase of the buildup. Then, perhaps three months down the line, preferably after the