George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

from Camp David towards Washington on that early August Sunday afternoon.
According to one published account, Bush was "in a mood that White House officials
describe variously as mad, testy, peevish, and, to use a favorite bit of Bush-speak, spleenventing."
This observer, Maureen Dowd of the New York Times, compared Reagan's
relaxed or somniferous crisis style with Bush's hyperkinesis: Reagan, she recalled, "slept
peacefully" during clashes of US and Libyan planes over the Mediterranean, but "Mr.
Bush, by contrast, becomes even more of a dervish" in such moments. According to Ms.
Dowd, "by the time the president came home from Camp David on Sunday afternoon, he
was feeling frustrated and testy. He was worried that the situation in Kuwait was
deteriorating, and intelligence reports showed him that the Iraqis were beginning to mass
at the Kuwait-Saudi border. He was also disappointed in the international response." [fn
40] As Bush was approaching Washington, Bush called his press secretary, Marlin
Fitzwater, to ask him his opinion about whether to pause at the microphones on the south
lawn before going into the White House. Fitzwater appears to have supported the idea.
According to Ms. Dowd, an eyewitness, Bush was "visibly furious" when he climbed out
of his helicopter. As Bush walked towards the microphones, he was accosted by Richard
Haas of the NSC staff who thrust a cable into Bush's hands. Bush read the cable,
scowling. However ugly his mood had been before he had seen the memo, reading it sent
him into an apoplectic rage. According to White House officials, this cable contained
information about the dimensions of the Iraqi troop buildup and indicated that the Iraqi
troops were moving south towards the Saudi border, and not leaving Kuwait. [fn 41]
According to Ms. Dowd, this was the secret memo that "seemed to spark the President's
irritation at his news conference. In any case, Bush now launched into a violent diatribe
that left no doubt that as far as he was considered, the desired outcome was now war.
In Bush's opening statement, he summarized the result of his frenetic "speed dialing"
exercise: Oezal, Kaifu, Mulroney, Mitterrand, Kohl, Thatcher, the Emir of Kuwait had all
been reached. The alleged result:
What's emerging is nobody is -- seems to be showing up as willing to accept anything
less than total withdrawal from Iraq, from Kuwait of the Iraqi forces, and no puppet
regime. We've been down that road, and there will be no puppet regime that will be
accepted by any countries that I'm familiar with. And there seems to be a united front out
there that says Iraq, having committed brutal, naked aggression, ought to get out and that
the-- this concept of their installing some puppet leaving behind will not be acceptable.
So, we're pushing forward on diplomacy. We've gotten-- tomorrow I will meet here in
Washington with the Secretary General of the United Nations-- I mean, the Secretary
General of NATO-- and Margaret Thatcher will be coming in here tomorrow, and I will
be continuing this diplomatic effort.
What about the situation on the ground? Had Iraq pulled out?
Iraq lied once again. They said they were going to start moving out today and we have no
evidence that they're moving out.