George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

would be Bush, but he wasn't all that happy about it." [fn 29] But this was not yet the last
word.
Casey, Meese, and Deaver sounded out Ford, who was reluctant but did not issue a
categorical rejection. Stuart Spencer, Ford's 1976 campaign manager, reported to Reagan
on his contacts with Ford. ''Ron,' Spencer said, 'Ford ain't gonna do it, and you're gonna
pick Bush.' But judging from Reagan's reaction, Spencer recalled later, "There was no
way he was going to pick Bush,'and the reason was simple: Reagan just didn't like the
guy. "It was chemistry,' Spencer said. [fn 30]
Reagan now had to be ground down by an assortment of Eastern Liberal Establishment
perception-mongers and political heavies. Much of the well-known process of negotiation
between Reagan and Ford for the "Dream Ticket" of 1980 was simply a charade to
disorient and demoralize Reagan while eating up the clock until the point was reached
when Reagan would have no choice but to make the classic phone call to Bush. It is
obvious that Reagan offered the Vice Presidency to Ford, and that the latter refused to
accept it outright, but engaged in a process of negotiations ostensibly in order to establish
the conditions under which he might, eventually, accept. [ fn 31] Casey called in Henry
Kissinger and asked him to intercede with Ford. What then developed was a marathon of
haggling in which Ford was represented by Kissinger, Alan Greenspan, Jack Marsh, and
Bob Barrett. Reagan was represented by Casey, Meese, and perception-monger Richard
Wirthlin. Dick Cheney, Ford's former chief of staff and now Bush's pro-genocide
Secretary of Defense, also got into the act.
The strategy of Bush and Casey was to draw out the talks, running out the clock until
Reagan would be forced to pick someone. Inside the negotiations, the Ford camp made
demand after demand. Would Ford have a voice on foreign policy and defense? Would
he be a member of the cabinet? Would he become the White House chief of staff? At the
same time, leaks were made to the press about the negotiations and how sweeping
constitutional issues were being haggled over in a classic smoke-filled room. These leaks
became more and more embarrassing, making it easy to convince Reagan that his imnage
was being tarnished, that he ought to call off the talks and pick Bush.
This complex strategy of intrigue culminated in Ford's notorious interview with Walter
Cronkite, in which the CBS anchor man asked Ford if "It's got to be something like a copresidency?"
"That's something Governor Reagan really ought to consider," replied Ford,
which was not what a serious vice presidential candidate might say, but did correspond
rather well to what "Jerry the Jerk" would say if he wanted to embarass Reagan and help
Bush. As for Cronkite, was it possible that his coining of the term "co-presidency" was
stimulated by someone from Prescott Bush's old circles at CBS?
Bombarded by the media now with the "co-president" thesis, Reagan began to see
foreshadowings of a public relations debacle. Television reporters began to hype an
imminent visit by Reagan and Ford to the convention to present the "Dream Ticket."
Meese was despatched to Kissinger to demand a straight answer from the Ford camp.
"Kissinger told Meese that the Ford side might not be able to have an answer until the