George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

Pickens? Gorbachov's reply is recalled by participants as brusque to the point of
rudeness: "Not even Jesus Christ knows the answer to that question," said he, amidst the
gasps of Bush's staff. A minute later, Gorbachov turned to Bush with a lecture: "Let me
take this opportunity to tell you something. Your staff may have told you that what I'm
doing is all a trick. It's not. I'm playing real politics. I have a revolution going that I
announced in 1986. Now, in 1988, the Soviet people don't like it. Don't misread me, Mr.
Vice President, I have to play real politics." [fn 4] After that, the telegenic Gorbachov
could look for his photo opportunities somewhere else during most of 1989. There would
ne no early Most Favored Nation trade status for Moscow. In addition, the signals from
London were to go slow. The result was Bush's "prudent review" of US-Soviet relations.
Gorbachov was always hungry for summitry, and during an April visit to Thatcher, the
Soviet leader chided Bush for the US "hesitation" on new arms control deals. Bush
dismissed this remark with a huff: "We're making a prudent review, and I will be ready to
discuss that with the Soviets when we are ready. We'll be ready to react when we feel like
reacting." [fn 5] Ministerial meeting between Baker and Shevardnadze were proceeding.
In May, the voice of Reagan was heard from his California retirement, telling his friends
that he was "increasingly concerned at what he considers an excessively cautious
approach to nuclear arms reductions with the Soviets." Reagan thought that Bush was
indeed too hesitant, and that Gorbachov was seizing the initiative with western Europe as
a result. In the view attributed to Reagan by these unnamed friends, "Bush opted for the
delaying tactic of a policy review, behaving the way new presidents do when replacing
someone from the opposing party with different views." According to journalist Lou
Cannon, "both in Bonn and in Beverly Hills they are wondering if Bush's only strategy is
to react to events as they unfold." [fn 6] There was the wimp again.
In September, Bush was in Helena, Montana, sounding the same prudent note while
defending himself from Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, who had been making some
debater's points about Bush's "timidity" and "status-quo" thinking. Bush repeated that he
was in "no rush" for a summit with Gorbachov. "I don't think there's any chance of a
disconnect" in Moscow's comprehension that "we want to see their perestroika succeed,"
said Bush. [fn 7]
What changed Bush's mind was the collapse of the East German communist regime,
which had been gathering speed during the summer of 1989 with the thousands of East
Germans demanding admittance to West German embassies, first in Hungary, and then in
Czechoslovakia. Then, in one of the most dramatic developments in recent decades of
European history, the Berlin Wall and the East German "shoot to kill" order along the
line of demarcation in the middle of Germany were tossed into the dustbin of history.
This was one of the most positive events that the generations born after 1945 had ever
witnessed. But for Bush and the Anglo-Americans, it was the occasion for public
tantrums.
For Bush individually, the breaching of the Berlin Wall of 1961 was the detonator of one
of his most severe episodes thus far of public emotional disturbance. Bush had repeated
Reagan's sure-fire formula of "Mr. Gorbachov, tear this wall down," during a visit to