George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

military action against Iraq under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. Soon Bush's entourage had also picked up this new fad.
Bush had now changed his tune markedly. He had suddenly and publicly re-acquired his
military options. When asked about his response, he stated:
We're not ruling any options in but we're not ruling any options out.
Bush also revealed that he had told the Arab leaders with whom he had been in contact
during the morning that the Gulf crisis "had gone beyond simply a regional dispute
because of the naked aggression that violates the United Nations charter." These
formulations were I.D. format Thatcher-speak. Bush condemned Saddam for "his
intolerable behavior," again parrotting Thatcher's line. Bush was now "very much
concerned" about the safety of other small Gulf states. Bush also referred to the hostage
question, saying that threats to American citizens would "affect the United States in a
very dramatic way because I view a fundamental responsibility of my presidency [as
being] to protect American citzens." Bush added that he had talked with Thatcher about
British proposals to press for "collective efforts" by members of the United Nations
against Iraq. The Iraqi invasion was a "totally unjustified act," Bush went on. It was now
imperative that the "international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces leave
Kuwait immediately. Bush revealed that he and his advisors were now examing the "next
steps" to end the crisis. Bush said he was "somewhat heartened" by his telephone
conversations with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and Gen.
Ali Abdallah Salib of Yemen.
There is every reason to believe that Bush's decision to launch US military intervention
and war was taken in Aspen, under the hypnotic influence of Thatcher. Any residual
hesitancy displayed in secret councils was merely dissembling to prevent his staffs from
opposing that decision. Making a strategic decision of such collossal implications on the
basis of a psycho-manipulative pep talk from Thatcher suggests that Bush's hyperthyroid
condition was already operating; the hyperthyroid patient notoriously tends to resolve
complicated and far-reaching alternatives with quick, snap decisions. Several published
accounts have sought to argue that the decision for large-scale intervention did not come
until Saturday at Camp David, but these accounts belong to the "red Studebaker" school
of coverup. The truth is that Bush went to war as the racist tail on the British imperial
kite, cheered on by the Kissinger cabal that permeated and dominated his administration.
As the London Daily Telegraph gloated, Mrs. Thatcher had "stiffened [Bush's] resolve."
Bush had been scheduled to stay overnight in Aspen, but he now departed immediately
for Washington. Later, the White House said that Bush had been on the phone with Saudi
King Fahd, who had agreed that the Iraqi invasion was "absolutely unacceptable." [fn 35]
On the return trip and through the evening, the Kissingerian operative Scowcroft
continued to to press for military intervention, playing down the difficulties which other
avdisers had been citing. Given Kissinger's long-standing relationship with London and
the Foreign Office, it was no surprise that Scowcroft was fully on the London line.