George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Get a Free Blog

Bhutto, in Bush's suit at the Waldorf- Astoria. Huang Hua, the Chinese delegate, made
remarks which Kissinger chose to interpret as meaning that the "Chinese might intervene
militarily even at this late stage."
December 12- Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig met in the Oval Office early Sunday morning
in a council of war. Kissinger later described this as a crucial meeting, where, as it turned
out, "the first decision to risk war in the triangular Soviet-Chinese-American" relation
was taken. [fn 19]
During Nixon's 1975 secret grand jury testimony to the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force, the former President insisted that the United States had come "close to nuclear
war" during the Indo- Pakistani conflict. According to one attorney who heard Nixon's
testimony in 1975, Nixon had stated that "we had threatened to go to nuclear war with the
Russians." [fn 20] These remarks most probably refer to this December 12 meeting, and
the actions it set into motion.
Navy Task Force 74 was ordered to proceed through the Straits of Malacca and into the
Indian Ocean, and it attracted the attention of the world media in so doing the following
day. Task Force 74 was now on wartime alert.
At 11:30 AM local time, Kissinger and Haid sent the Kremlin a message over the Hot
Line. This was the first use of the Hot Line during the Nixon administration, and
apparently the only time it was used during the Nixon years with the exception of the
October 1973 Middle East War. According to Kissinger, this Hot Line message contained
the ultimatum that the Soviets respond to earlier American demands; otherwise Nixon
would order Bush to "set in train certain moves " in the UN Security Council that would
be irreversible. But is this all the message said? Kissinger comments in his memoirs a
few pages later: "Our fleet passed through the Strait of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal
and attracted much media attention. Were we threatening India? Were we seeking to
defend East Pakistan? Had we lost our minds? It was in fact sober calculation. We had
some seventy-two hours to bring the war to a conclusion before West Pakistan would be
swept into the maelstrom. It would take India that long to shift its forces and mount an
assault. Once Pakistan's air force and army were destroyed, its impotence would
guarantee the country's eventual disintegration... We had to give the Soviets a warning
that matters might get out of control on our side too. We had to be ready to back up the
Chinese if at the last moment they came in after all, our UN initiative having failed. [...]
However unlikely an American military move against India, the other side could not be
sure; it might not be willing to accept even the minor risk that we might act irrationally."
[fn 21]
These comments by Kissinger lead to the conclusion that the Hot Line message of
December 12 was part of a calculated exercise in thermonuclear blackmail and
brinksmanship. Kissinger's reference to acting irrationally recalls the infamous RAND
Corporation theories of thermonculear confrontations as chicken games in which it is
useful to hint to the opposition that one is insane. If your adversary thinks you are crazy,
then he is more likely to back down, the argument goes. Whatever threats were made by