stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

transcendental freedom is a problem for theoretical knowledge as it is to understand why
transcendental freedom is not a problem for practical knowledge. It is not enough just to
recognize that the meaning of ‘the sensible’ changes in practical knowledge. It is just as
important to recognize that the meaning of ‘the intelligible’ changes as well.
Kant approaches the question of transcendental freedom in terms of character. “Every
efficient cause must have a character, that is, a law of its causality, without which it would not
be a cause” (CPR A539/B498). There are two such characters. First, there is the empirical
character. “On the above supposition, we should, therefore, in a subject belonging to the sensible
world have, first, an empirical character, whereby its actions, as appearances, stand in
thoroughgoing connection with other appearances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature.
And since these actions can be derived from the other appearances, they constitute together with
them a single series in the order of nature” (CPR A539/B498). The causality of the empirical
character is determined. “In its empirical character, therefore, this subject, as appearance, would
have to conform to all the laws of determination. To this extent it could be nothing more than
part of the world of sense…” (CPR A540/B568). However, we ought to be careful when
interpreting such claims. We must always keep the meaning of the terms appropriate to whatever
kind of knowledge we are talking about. “Here [in practice] sensibility is not regarded as a
capacity for intuition at all but only as a feeling (which can be a subjective ground of desire)”
(CPrR5:90). What is it that determines the causality of the empirical character? Note it cannot be
the laws of nature. If the laws of nature determined that causality then sensibility in practice
would in fact have to be regarded as the capacity for intuition. But that is precisely not how it is
regarded. Instead, sensibility is feeling as the subjective ground of desire. Therefore, Kant
argues, it is actually feeling as the subjective ground of desire that determines this causality.
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