stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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presupposed” (CPR B422). In this sense, das Selbstbewusstsein is not the consciousness of some objective self. “The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object” (CPR B409). In Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics W.H. Walsh writes that “only if [Kant] makes consciousness of mental activity continuous with mental activity itself will he be able to avoid awkward questions about what self it is that I know when I know what I am about” (Walsh 187). Das Selbstbewusstsein is nothing other than the consciousness as the power of combining. In this sense, das Selbstbewusstsein cannot really be called knowledge of the self at all. “The consciousness of the self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self, notwithstanding all the categories which are being employed…Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of an object in general (in the category), an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for knowledge of myself I require, besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought” (CPRB158). Instead, das Selbstbewusstsein is more like knowledge as the self. “I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination” (CPR B158). Das Selbstbewusstsein is the actualization of the self. Fichte develops this point. “The self, we say, reverts into itself. So is it therefore not already present for itself before the occurrence of this reversion, and independently thereof? Must it not already be there for itself, in order that it may make itself the object of an act? And if so doesn’t your philosophy in the case already presuppose what it was meant to explain?” (Fichte I 459). Fichte insists: “I answer: not at all. It is only through this act, and first by means of it, by an act upon an act itself, which specific act is preceded by no other whatever, that the self originally comes to exist of itself” (Fichte I 459). 7 Schelling writes that “the self simply has no existence, prior to that act whereby thinking 7 See also Fichte I 458, I 463, I 499. 131
ecomes its own object, and is thus itself nothing other than thinking becoming its object, and hence absolute nothing apart from the thought” (366-67). Das Selbstbewusstsein is the act of the self as an act. Fichte writes that “self and self-reverting act are perfectly identical concepts” (I 462). And Schelling concludes that “what the self is, we experience only by bringing it forth, for nowhere but in the self is the identity of being and producing fundamental” (Schelling 371-2). 8 Representational knowledge knows some objective self. But das Selbstbewusstsein is the act of the self as an act. In this sense, das Selbstbewusstsein is the coincidence of acting and being. “For the categories are those functions of thought (judgment) as already applied to our sensible intuition, such intuition being required if I seek to know myself. If, on the other hand, I would be conscious of myself simply as thinking, then since I am not considering how my own self may be given in intuition, the self may be mere appearance to me, the ‘I’ that thinks is no mere appearance in so far as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought” (CPR B429). Again it is Fichte who recognizes this point. “The intellect as such observes itself; and this self-observation is directed immediately upon its every feature. The nature of intelligence consists in this immediate unity of being and seeing…By being posited as intellect, that for which it exists is already posited with it. In the intellect, therefore—to speak figuratively—there is a double series, of being and of seeing, of the real and of the ideal” (Fichte I 436). But it is Schelling who drives this point home. “The task, in a nutshell, consists of finding the point at which subject and object are immediately one. This unmediated identity of subject and object can exist only where the presented is at the same time that which presents…But this identity of presenter and presented occurs only in self- 8 For interpretation of self-consciousness as an example of knowledge as actualization see CPR A402, B153, B157, B158, B159, B407, B408, B409, B414, B415, B421, B422, B429, B430, B431, and B432. See also Allison (1990 36-7), Heidegger (254-258), Hurley (151-3), Keller (2-9), Kelly (244-8), Kitcher (380-3), Mandt (28-30), Reuscher (276-290), Walsh (185-9), and Wilkerson (51-4). 132
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The Ethics of Kant’s Practice: Or
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Koje je bolje? Jeda
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PART II: Deleuze and the ethics of
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associates such an actualization wi
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ability to will. This is important.
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subject is already within that whic
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Nietzsche. In “Existing Not as a
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transcendental in ethics. (I do not
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instance, in The Science of Knowled
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concept. When we approach these dis
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What is a faculty? Empirical knowle
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the principle of their possibility
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elow one of the things that I will
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The activity of analyzing Kant anal
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object” (CPR A68/B93). That conce
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The activity of combining Kant does
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understand them. “But the combina
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The categories Concepts do not rest
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employed in determination of the ma
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therefore of the possibility of the
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producing the judgment that necessa
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to these and the intuition of them,
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concept of body does not occur, but
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Transcendental deduction The abilit
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deduction, such as we have been abl
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egins with the matter of experience
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abstract, namely, that the manifold
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Chapter 2: The thing in itself as t
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knowledge. I claim that representat
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The ability to reason The goal of t
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In the scientific method, reason do
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object that steht knowledge entgege
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The Bounds of Sense P.F. Strawson r
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appearance. “The distinction, whi
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objects in abstraction from this ab
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can never—at least not in the man
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eason. In fact, Kant thinks that th
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things in themselves. But what is t
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objective facts. It is as if they r
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object. “Although to the question
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cannot know freedom not so much bec
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presupposed prior to all appearance
Page 85 and 86: themselves are thinkers” (Langton
Page 87 and 88: For this reason, we must know abili
Page 89 and 90: Chapter 3: The actualization of fre
Page 91 and 92: absolute worth as ends in themselve
Page 93 and 94: happiness, in perfection, in moral
Page 95 and 96: 5:90). In short, “in the present
Page 97 and 98: the uses of abilities in practice c
Page 99 and 100: important to acknowledge that for K
Page 101 and 102: desire, and where there are no mere
Page 103 and 104: in the determination of choice thro
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Page 107 and 108: transcendental freedom is a problem
Page 109 and 110: character (which is no more than th
Page 111 and 112: place, contains nothing borrowed fr
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Page 115 and 116: writes: “will is generally and us
Page 117 and 118: problem of freedom is as simple as
Page 119 and 120: The non-material objects of the wil
Page 121 and 122: Kant’s Theory of Freedom Allison
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Page 125 and 126: Respect for humanity The form of th
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Page 129 and 130: law alone must be viewed as the gro
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Page 133 and 134: theoretical knowledge. In this sens
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Page 139 and 140: Kant’s due Fichte writes that “
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Page 143 and 144: PART II: The ethics of repetition
Page 145 and 146: something else, a kind of paradoxic
Page 147 and 148: knowledge as a kind of third to the
Page 149 and 150: But this is not the only significan
Page 151 and 152: of these relations is what Deleuze
Page 153 and 154: are? They do so only by actually kn
Page 155 and 156: faculty of knowledge itself? Kant
Page 157 and 158: eason would do anything but reason;
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Page 163 and 164: An interest of reason determines th
Page 165 and 166: faculties” (DI 64). For this reas
Page 167 and 168: forms. “In fact the imagination d
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Page 173 and 174: form of object which reflects the s
Page 175 and 176: is what it means to say that differ
Page 177 and 178: “The entire Kantian critique amou
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Page 181 and 182: passive self is to be immersed mean
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Page 185 and 186: Deleuze often says that difference
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of experience is at the same time t
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coexisting levels” (DR 84). That
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cannot be infinite. But how can tim
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to the same thing. In the second sy
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case the passive self passes from o
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efore or after something, the livin
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domain that we have had to extend t
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contemplation, whether it is not in
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can in some sense live the being in
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with which it is invested” (DR 85
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and future are not distributed acco
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has been fractured, dissolved. But
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The concept I have distinguished be
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difference, that absolutely differe
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We must be careful when we judge th
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matter of production, not of adequa
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differential and repeating element
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eminiscence but, on the contrary, t
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univocal being takes the form of it
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that relates it to extended space a
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argues “that the similarity betwe
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activity of the Cogito, namely reco
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ody Deleuze calls the dominant forc
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their reciprocal genesis derives”
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argues that “according to physici
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of becoming) and those who deny the
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order for the individual to repeat,
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Deleuze’s Nietzschean ethics Dele
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not a ‘mere feeling.’ It is a f
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these principles)” (Patton 288).
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‘quasi-causes’ following laws w
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I have talked about ethics in terms
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emergence of any new mode of existe
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than that critical philosophy begin
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itself in the name of truth means t
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What is his type, his will to power
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“Nietzsche presents the aim of hi
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To think is to learn. To learn is t
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Continental Philosophy. 10.1 (2006)
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143-170. Ewing, A.C. A Short Commen
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kan
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Protevi, John. “The Organism as t
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Werkmesiter, W.H. “The Complement
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