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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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freedom, reason gives to itself and thereby proves itself a priori to be practical” (CPrR 5:65). I<br />

understand practical freedom not by representing it as an object, but by making it into the<br />

transcendental freedom. This is the sense in which the good will is one <strong>of</strong> the “categories <strong>of</strong><br />

freedom” (CPrR 5:65) (the other being evil). The good that is the object <strong>of</strong> the autonomous will<br />

is the action itself. “Thus good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to action, not to the person’s<br />

state <strong>of</strong> feeling, and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely (and in every respect and without<br />

any further condition), or is to be held as such, it would be only the way <strong>of</strong> acting, the maxim <strong>of</strong><br />

the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil human being, that could be<br />

so called, but not a thing” (CPrR 5:60). Thus Kant concludes that the object <strong>of</strong> the autonomous<br />

will is not just the good will as practical freedom but also as transcendental freedom. But this is<br />

nothing other than what it means to say that practical knowledge is an actualization. Reason<br />

actualizes itself in the good will as practical freedom and as transcendental freedom. “Practical<br />

reason, on the contrary, since it does not have to do with objects for the sake <strong>of</strong> cognizing them<br />

but with its own ability to make them real (conformably with cognition <strong>of</strong> them), that is, with a<br />

will that is a causality inasmuch as reason contains its determining ground;…it follows that a<br />

critique <strong>of</strong> the Analytic <strong>of</strong> reason, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it is to be a practical reason (and this is the real<br />

problem), must begin from the possibility <strong>of</strong> practical principles a priori” (CPrR 5:90). But the<br />

good will as practical freedom and transcendental freedom is not the only object <strong>of</strong> the<br />

autonomous will.<br />

I would like to draw together the two claims that I am making. I argue that the<br />

autonomous will does have an object. However I argue that this object is not the determining<br />

ground <strong>of</strong> the will. Instead, it is the object that the autonomous will actualizes. But what is this<br />

object? It is called the good will. However, when we look into the good will we recognize that<br />

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