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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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object that steht knowledge entgegen, der Gegenstand. Instead, we determine the form <strong>of</strong> the<br />

object. In this sense, transcendental idealism is an account <strong>of</strong> knowledge as representation, that<br />

is, as re-presentation <strong>of</strong> the matter by means <strong>of</strong> forms. Kant calls these representations<br />

appearances. Thus “appearances are only representations <strong>of</strong> things which are unknown as regards<br />

what they may be in themselves” (CPR B164). That knowledge takes the form <strong>of</strong> representation<br />

in fact carries important consequences for the thing in itself.<br />

Representational knowledge commits itself to the existence <strong>of</strong> that which is represented<br />

and that something is the thing in itself. Karl Ameriks recognizes this point in Interpreting<br />

Kant’s Critiques: “ultimately Kant has in mind the thought that whenever he goes so far as to<br />

understand something as an appearance in the transcendental sense <strong>of</strong> a mere appearance…he is<br />

taking this also to imply the existence <strong>of</strong> something that is truly a thing in itself and not a mere<br />

appearance…[T]hroughout Kant's discussions, the notion <strong>of</strong> a thing is always basic, and the<br />

notion <strong>of</strong> a mere appearance is to be understood as derivative, as something introduced because<br />

<strong>of</strong> a feature that cannot sustain the status <strong>of</strong> being a proper characterization <strong>of</strong> the thing<br />

simpliciter” (Ameriks 34). But that is not all. Representational knowledge commits itself to the<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> the thing in itself understood as the object that steht that knowledge entgegen, der<br />

Gegenstand. For this reason, Kant calls this thing in itself the transcendental object. “Now, also,<br />

we are in a position to determine more adequately our concept <strong>of</strong> an object [der Gegenstand] in<br />

general. All representations have, as representations, their object [ihren Gegenstand].<br />

Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which<br />

relates immediately to the object [der Gegenstand] is called intuition. But these appearances are<br />

not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object [der<br />

Gegenstand]– an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be<br />

58

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