stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of appearance. “In dealing with those concepts and
principles which we adopt a priori, all that we can do is to contrive that they be used for viewing
objects from two different points of view—on the one hand, in connection with experience, as
objects of the sense and of the understanding, and on the other hand, for the isolated reason that
strives to transcend all limits of experience, as objects which are thought merely” (CPR Bxixn).
Things in themselves are not appearances of the abilities to sense and to understand. Instead,
they are appearances of the ability to reason. Thus Kant talks about the “appearance, which
always has two sides, the one by which the object is viewed in and by itself (without regard to
the mode of intuiting it – its nature therefore remaining always problematic), the other by which
the form of the intuition of this object is taken into account” (CPR B55/A39). Specifically, Kant
talks about “things when they are considered in themselves through reason” (CPR A28/B44).
Many commentators develop this point. Henry E. Allison argues that the distinction between
appearances and things in themselves is to “be understood as holding between two ways of
considering things (as they appear and as they are in themselves)…” (Allison 2004 16). We can
consider objects in terms of the ability to sense, that is, we can intuit them in space and time.
Thus we consider objects as appearances. “Accordingly, in considering thing as they appear, we
are considering them in the way in which they are presented to discursive knowers with our
forms of sensibility” (Allison 2004 16). On the other hand, we can, to put it negatively, consider
could be added) that in most of the relevant statements Kant uses the terms ‘things in itself’ and ‘things in
themselves’ as abbreviations of the expression ‘things viewed (or contemplated) without reference to our
experiencing them in sensory intuition.’ That is to say, the distinction between the objects of experience as
phenomena and as things in themselves is not an ontological distinction but one of the perspective of viewing the
objects. Kant…says ‘when I view all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves’ (A206/B257. italics
added). This implies, I submit, that ‘in itself’ and ‘in themselves’ are adverbial rather than adjectival determinants
and should be read: ‘thing-considered-in-itself’ and ‘things-considered-in-themselves’ –hyphenated.” (Werkmeister
303).
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