stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
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presupposed” (CPR B422). In this sense, das Selbstbewusstsein is not the consciousness <strong>of</strong> some<br />
objective self. “The analysis, then, <strong>of</strong> the consciousness <strong>of</strong> myself in thought in general, yields<br />
nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge <strong>of</strong> myself as object” (CPR B409). In Kant’s<br />
Criticism <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics W.H. Walsh writes that “only if [Kant] makes consciousness <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
activity continuous with mental activity itself will he be able to avoid awkward questions about<br />
what self it is that I know when I know what I am about” (Walsh 187). Das Selbstbewusstsein is<br />
nothing other than the consciousness as the power <strong>of</strong> combining. In this sense, das<br />
Selbstbewusstsein cannot really be called knowledge <strong>of</strong> the self at all. “The consciousness <strong>of</strong> the<br />
self is thus very far from being a knowledge <strong>of</strong> the self, notwithstanding all the categories which<br />
are being employed…Just as for knowledge <strong>of</strong> an object distinct from me I require, besides the<br />
thought <strong>of</strong> an object in general (in the category), an intuition by which I determine that general<br />
concept, so for knowledge <strong>of</strong> myself I require, besides the consciousness, that is, besides the<br />
thought <strong>of</strong> myself, an intuition <strong>of</strong> the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought”<br />
(CPRB158). Instead, das Selbstbewusstsein is more like knowledge as the self. “I exist as an<br />
intelligence which is conscious solely <strong>of</strong> its power <strong>of</strong> combination” (CPR B158). Das<br />
Selbstbewusstsein is the actualization <strong>of</strong> the self. Fichte develops this point. “The self, we say,<br />
reverts into itself. So is it therefore not already present for itself before the occurrence <strong>of</strong> this<br />
reversion, and independently there<strong>of</strong>? Must it not already be there for itself, in order that it may<br />
make itself the object <strong>of</strong> an act? And if so doesn’t your philosophy in the case already<br />
presuppose what it was meant to explain?” (Fichte I 459). Fichte insists: “I answer: not at all. It<br />
is only through this act, and first by means <strong>of</strong> it, by an act upon an act itself, which specific act is<br />
preceded by no other whatever, that the self originally comes to exist <strong>of</strong> itself” (Fichte I 459). 7<br />
Schelling writes that “the self simply has no existence, prior to that act whereby thinking<br />
7 See also Fichte I 458, I 463, I 499.<br />
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