stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

disinterested, in other words, that it does not legislate over objects that are subject to it does not
mean that the faculty of feeling does not legislate at all.
“When the faculty of knowledge is grasped in its higher form, the understanding
legislates in that faculty; when the faculty of desire is grasped in its higher form, reason
legislates in that faculty. When the faculty of feeling is grasped in its higher form, it is judgment
which legislates in that faculty” (KCP 61). Judgment is not a faculty like the understanding,
imagination and reason. In other words, judgment is not a representation. Instead, judgment
expresses the accord between representations. “Every time Kant speaks of judgement as if it
were a faculty it is to emphasize the originality of its act, the specificity of its product. But
judgment always implies several faculties, and expresses the accord between them” (KCP 59). In
what sense does judgment express the accord between representations? “Judgment is always a
complex operation which consists in subsuming the particular under the general” (KCP 58).
Judgment expresses the accord between representations to the extent that it subsumes the
particular under the general within them. However, there are two ways of doing this.
Determining judgment expresses the accord between the faculties where one faculty legislates.
“Judgement is said to be determining when it expresses the accord of the faculties under a faculty
which is itself determining: that is when it determines an object in accordance with a faculty
posited at the outset as legislative” (KCP 59). This is the case with the faculties of knowledge
and desire. Deleuze argues that in the determining judgment “the general is already given,
known, and all that is required is to apply it, that is to determine the individual thing to which it
applies…” (KCP 58). When judgment subsumes the particular under the general in the faculties
of knowledge and desire the general is already given in the legislating faculties, that is, in the
understanding and reason. “Saying that judgment determines an object is equivalent to saying
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