stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

Kant’s Theory of Freedom Allison acknowledges this point: “in the Dialectic, Kant defines
freedom in the practical sense as the “will’s independence of coercion through sensuous
impulses,’ and he attempts to clarify this by means of the contrast between a ‘pathologically
affected’ and ‘pathologically necessitated’ will” (Allison 1990 55). Also, Allison claims, “in the
Canon, Kant describes practical freedom in substantially the same terms. Once again, he
distinguishes between arbitrium brutum, which is pathologically determined, and arbitrium
liberum ‘which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through
motives which are represented only by reason’” (Allison 1990 55). The object of the autonomous
will is the good will. But the good will is nothing other than practical freedom. However, the
good will is not only the object of the autonomous will as practical freedom.
“For, in the present Critique we shall begin with principles and proceed to concepts”
(CPrR5:16). In what sense do we move from principles to concepts in practice? Kant elaborates
on this point in the Critique of Pure Reason. “He [man] is thus to himself…in respect of certain
faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely
intelligible object. We entitle these faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular,
we distinguish in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned powers. For
it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the
understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts”
(CPR A547/B575). That we begin with principles and proceed to concepts in practice means that
reason determines the understanding. Unlike theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge
actualizes its object. Therefore that reason determines the understanding in practice means that
the object that reason actualizes is understood. However, we must be careful. This understanding
of the object that reason actualizes is not theoretical but rather practical. That we understand an
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