stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

the Copernican Revolution is the essence of the Copernican Counter-Revolution. In other words,
the Copernican Counter-Revolution names the emergence of the qualitative distinction of
subjectivity and objectivity that characterizes the essential aspect of the history of western
philosophy.
That the passive self does not synthesize conceptually means that that which it
synthesizes cannot take the form of the object. Instead, that the passive self synthesizes within
that which it synthesizes means that whatever that something is, it must take the following form:
1) it must be its whole reality, 2) it must be its whole chaotic reality to the extent that the passive
self does not arrive to it with a concept in hand, and 3) it must be its whole, chaotic and
productive reality to the extent that it is within it that the passive self develops concepts at all.
Deleuze calls this non-objective object in which the passive self immerses itself difference. It is
within difference that the passive self gets to know at all. Moreover, that this knowledge does not
take the form of conceptual synthesis means that knowledge cannot be spontaneity. Instead, if
knowledge arises out of the sensible and organic syntheses within that which has the power to
differ, Deleuze thinks that such knowledge is most properly characterized as repetition. I do not
bring knowledge to the object. Instead, the passive self develops knowledge within the object
that does not yet exist. Still, that such knowledge is repetition does not make it any less
important than spontaneous knowledge. Actually, Deleuze argues, that the contrary is actually
the case. The opposite of necessary knowledge is contingent knowledge. But repetition is just as
little contingent knowledge as it is necessary knowledge. Repetition is the very condition of the
existence of the self and for that reason cannot be merely contingent. At the same time however,
such repetition cannot be necessary, because it itself does not arise out of concepts. Instead, it is
concepts that arise out of it. This is why too Deleuze finds it necessary to talk about the singular
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