02.09.2013 Views

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

prior to theory altogether. Deleuze criticizes the Cogito. But he does not criticize the Cogito<br />

because the Cogito cannot think what there really is. Instead, Deleuze criticizes the Cogito<br />

simply because it thinks badly. But what does ‘badly’ refer to in the previous sentence if not to<br />

its inability to think what there really is? “When Nietzsche questions the most general<br />

presuppositions <strong>of</strong> philosophy, he says that these are essentially moral, since Morality alone is<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will, and that only<br />

the good can ground the supposed affinity between thought and the True. Who else, in effect, but<br />

Morality, and this Good which gives thought to the true, and the true to thought?” (DR 132).<br />

Deleuze criticizes the Cogito because its thinking demonstrates an ethical badness. What does it<br />

mean for a way <strong>of</strong> thinking to be ethically bad?<br />

In what follows I develop Deleuze’s ethics. I argue that his ethics are fundamentally<br />

Nietzschean in nature. For this reason, I begin by discussing Deleuze’s interpretation <strong>of</strong><br />

Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy. I will argue that the ethical difference between good and<br />

bad is the difference between those lives that affirm their own difference and those that deny<br />

their own difference, in other words, the ethical difference between good and bad is the<br />

difference between becoming and being. I hope that this statement conveys something important<br />

to the reader. If the Cogito thinks badly in the sense that he does not affirm his own difference<br />

and is rather than becomes, then the Overman does think well in the sense that he does affirm his<br />

own difference and becomes. This is precisely what it means for knowledge to be apprenticeship<br />

and learning. This insight allows me to make the most important point <strong>of</strong> this <strong>thesis</strong>. Deleuze<br />

argues in favour <strong>of</strong> the Overman and against the Cogito not because the Overman thinks what<br />

there really is whereas the Cogito does not. Instead, it is because the practical activity <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Overman, namely repetition, is the demonstration <strong>of</strong> an ethically good life whereas the practical<br />

223

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!