stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph
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among all the ideas <strong>of</strong> speculative reason freedom is also the only one the possibility <strong>of</strong> which<br />
we know a priori…because it is the condition <strong>of</strong> the moral law, which we do know” (CPrR5:4).<br />
On the other hand, “the ideas <strong>of</strong> God and immortality, however, are not conditions <strong>of</strong> the moral<br />
law but only conditions <strong>of</strong> the necessary object <strong>of</strong> a will determined by this law, that is, <strong>of</strong> the<br />
mere practical use <strong>of</strong> pure reason; hence with respect to those ideas we cannot affirm that we<br />
cognize…–I do not merely say the reality but even the possibility <strong>of</strong> them” (CPrR5:4). In fact,<br />
this is why in the “Dialectic <strong>of</strong> pure practical reason” <strong>of</strong> the “Doctrine <strong>of</strong> the elements <strong>of</strong> pure<br />
practical reason” <strong>of</strong> the Critique <strong>of</strong> Practical Reason, Kant considers only God and immortality<br />
as real postulates, but not freedom. Alenka Zupančič recognizes this point in Ethics <strong>of</strong> the Real.<br />
“Unlike the two other postulates, which—as Kant stresses at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the Dialectic—do<br />
not enter the determining ground <strong>of</strong> the will, freedom, as indissolubly linked to the moral law, is<br />
the very determining ground <strong>of</strong> the will. Thus, in the Critique <strong>of</strong> Practical Reason freedom does<br />
not have only the function <strong>of</strong> a postulate, but is also, as a condition <strong>of</strong> any ethics, a fact, a ‘fact <strong>of</strong><br />
reason.’ So in a certain sense there are only two genuine postulates: the immortality <strong>of</strong> the soul,<br />
and God” (Zupančič 75-6). But what does it mean to know freedom practically?<br />
When reason is used by representational knowledge it <strong>of</strong>fers the thoughts <strong>of</strong> God,<br />
immortality and freedom as knowledge. But what form do these things in themselves take? The<br />
thing in itself that theoretical reason does not know is the transcendental object. God,<br />
immortality and freedom are objects that are separate, external and opposed to representational<br />
knowledge. In other words, God, immortality and freedom are objective facts. I do not mean<br />
objective fact in the non-technical, straightforward sense. Instead, I mean it in the technical,<br />
critical sense. Theoretical reason projects the thoughts <strong>of</strong> God, immortality and freedom as<br />
something separate, external and opposed to itself. It is in this sense that it understands them as<br />
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