stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

More documents

Recommendations

Info

epetition only by virtue of the change or difference that it introduces into the mind which contemplates it? By virtue of a difference that the mind draws from repetition” (DR 70). Contemplation is not something that organisms bring to repetition in the object, but it is also not something that they take from repetition in the object. Both of these cases suppose that organisms are something other than contemplation. Instead, contemplation is something that organisms develop in relation to the repetition in the object. In other words, organisms draw themselves, their own difference, themselves as the power of difference from repetition in the object. In this sense, contemplation is the repetition of that which does not repeat. “The role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from repetition, to draw difference from it. For that matter, repetition is itself in essence imaginary, since the imagination alone here forms the ‘moment’ of the vis repetativa from the point of view of its constitution: to makes that which it contracts appear as elements or cases of repetition. Imaginary repetition is not a false repetition which stands in for the absent true repetition: true repetition takes place in imagination” (DR 76). The object does not impose itself onto the subject. Nor does the subject impose itself on the object. The passive self learns something from the object that the object itself does not know, namely itself. It is in this sense that repetition in the object is the condition of contemplation. It allows for the constitution of contemplation. “In considering repetition in the object, we remain within the conditions which make possible an idea of repetition. But in considering the change in the subject, we are already beyond these conditions, confronting the general form of difference. The ideal constitution of repetition thus implies a kind of retroactive movement between these two limits. It is woven between the two” (DR 71). Deleuze argues that the development of contemplation is nothing other than the development of the passive self. “The question is whether or not the self itself is a 195
contemplation, whether it is not in itself contemplation, and whether we can learn, form behaviour and form ourselves other than through contemplation” (DR 73). The passive self does not contemplate. The passive self is contemplation. “There is a self wherever a furtive contemplation has been established whenever a contracting machine capable of drawing a difference from repetition functions somewhere. The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification – this term designating precisely the difference drawn” (DR 78-9). And contemplation is nothing other than the passive synthesis of time. Contemplation constitutes time as the living present. For this reason, there are as many living presents as there are contemplations. “All our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand intertwinings, the presents and fatigues of which we are composed, are defined on the basis of our contemplations. The rule is that one cannot go faster than one’s own present – or rather, one’s presents” (DR 77). Nevertheless, Deleuze does not think that an eternal living present is possible. “We could no doubt conceive of a perpetual present, a present which is coextensive with time: it would be sufficient to consider contemplation applied to the infinite succession of instants. But such a present is not physically possible” (DR 76). In other words, no contemplation constitutes time as the perpetual living present. No matter how long or how short a contemplation is, it always has to stop contemplating, otherwise eternal living present would have to be possible. In this sense, Deleuze argues, contemplation does not just constitute time as the living present. Instead, contemplation constitutes time as the living present that passes. “Although it is originary, the first synthesis of time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as present, but a present which passes” (DR 79). The problem with contemplation, Deleuze argues, is that it does not explain how the living present passes. “By insisting upon the finitude of contraction, we have shown the effect; we have by no means shown why the present passes, or 196
Page 1 and 2:
The Ethics of Kant’s Practice: Or
Page 3 and 4:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Koje je bolje? Jeda
Page 5 and 6:
PART II: Deleuze and the ethics of
Page 7 and 8:
associates such an actualization wi
Page 9 and 10:
ability to will. This is important.
Page 11 and 12:
subject is already within that whic
Page 13 and 14:
Nietzsche. In “Existing Not as a
Page 15 and 16:
transcendental in ethics. (I do not
Page 17 and 18:
instance, in The Science of Knowled
Page 19 and 20:
concept. When we approach these dis
Page 21 and 22:
What is a faculty? Empirical knowle
Page 23 and 24:
the principle of their possibility
Page 25 and 26:
elow one of the things that I will
Page 27 and 28:
The activity of analyzing Kant anal
Page 29 and 30:
object” (CPR A68/B93). That conce
Page 31 and 32:
The activity of combining Kant does
Page 33 and 34:
understand them. “But the combina
Page 35 and 36:
The categories Concepts do not rest
Page 37 and 38:
employed in determination of the ma
Page 39 and 40:
therefore of the possibility of the
Page 41 and 42:
producing the judgment that necessa
Page 43 and 44:
to these and the intuition of them,
Page 45 and 46:
concept of body does not occur, but
Page 47 and 48:
Transcendental deduction The abilit
Page 49 and 50:
deduction, such as we have been abl
Page 51 and 52:
egins with the matter of experience
Page 53 and 54:
abstract, namely, that the manifold
Page 55 and 56:
Chapter 2: The thing in itself as t
Page 57 and 58:
knowledge. I claim that representat
Page 59 and 60:
The ability to reason The goal of t
Page 61 and 62:
In the scientific method, reason do
Page 63 and 64:
object that steht knowledge entgege
Page 65 and 66:
The Bounds of Sense P.F. Strawson r
Page 67 and 68:
appearance. “The distinction, whi
Page 69 and 70:
objects in abstraction from this ab
Page 71 and 72:
can never—at least not in the man
Page 73 and 74:
eason. In fact, Kant thinks that th
Page 75 and 76:
things in themselves. But what is t
Page 77 and 78:
objective facts. It is as if they r
Page 79 and 80:
object. “Although to the question
Page 81 and 82:
cannot know freedom not so much bec
Page 83 and 84:
presupposed prior to all appearance
Page 85 and 86:
themselves are thinkers” (Langton
Page 87 and 88:
For this reason, we must know abili
Page 89 and 90:
Chapter 3: The actualization of fre
Page 91 and 92:
absolute worth as ends in themselve
Page 93 and 94:
happiness, in perfection, in moral
Page 95 and 96:
5:90). In short, “in the present
Page 97 and 98:
the uses of abilities in practice c
Page 99 and 100:
important to acknowledge that for K
Page 101 and 102:
desire, and where there are no mere
Page 103 and 104:
in the determination of choice thro
Page 105 and 106:
intervening feeling of pleasure or
Page 107 and 108:
transcendental freedom is a problem
Page 109 and 110:
character (which is no more than th
Page 111 and 112:
place, contains nothing borrowed fr
Page 113 and 114:
means that it cannot will. It must
Page 115 and 116:
writes: “will is generally and us
Page 117 and 118:
problem of freedom is as simple as
Page 119 and 120:
The non-material objects of the wil
Page 121 and 122:
Kant’s Theory of Freedom Allison
Page 123 and 124:
freedom, reason gives to itself and
Page 125 and 126:
Respect for humanity The form of th
Page 127 and 128:
good is the object that reason in p
Page 129 and 130:
law alone must be viewed as the gro
Page 131 and 132:
personal interests, and thereby fin
Page 133 and 134:
theoretical knowledge. In this sens
Page 135 and 136:
practical philosophy does not start
Page 137 and 138:
ecomes its own object, and is thus
Page 139 and 140:
Kant’s due Fichte writes that “
Page 141 and 142:
positive modes of knowledge which b
Page 143 and 144:
PART II: The ethics of repetition
Page 145 and 146:
something else, a kind of paradoxic
Page 147 and 148:
knowledge as a kind of third to the
Page 149 and 150: But this is not the only significan
Page 151 and 152: of these relations is what Deleuze
Page 153 and 154: are? They do so only by actually kn
Page 155 and 156: faculty of knowledge itself? Kant
Page 157 and 158: eason would do anything but reason;
Page 159 and 160: disinterested, in other words, that
Page 161 and 162: not legislate as determining judgme
Page 163 and 164: An interest of reason determines th
Page 165 and 166: faculties” (DI 64). For this reas
Page 167 and 168: forms. “In fact the imagination d
Page 169 and 170: they allow the understanding to exp
Page 171 and 172: capable of free spontaneous agreeme
Page 173 and 174: form of object which reflects the s
Page 175 and 176: is what it means to say that differ
Page 177 and 178: “The entire Kantian critique amou
Page 179 and 180: self also means that one must under
Page 181 and 182: passive self is to be immersed mean
Page 183 and 184: demonstration of this power of diff
Page 185 and 186: Deleuze often says that difference
Page 187 and 188: of experience is at the same time t
Page 189 and 190: coexisting levels” (DR 84). That
Page 191 and 192: cannot be infinite. But how can tim
Page 193 and 194: to the same thing. In the second sy
Page 195 and 196: case the passive self passes from o
Page 197 and 198: efore or after something, the livin
Page 199: domain that we have had to extend t
Page 203 and 204: can in some sense live the being in
Page 205 and 206: with which it is invested” (DR 85
Page 207 and 208: and future are not distributed acco
Page 209 and 210: has been fractured, dissolved. But
Page 211 and 212: The concept I have distinguished be
Page 213 and 214: difference, that absolutely differe
Page 215 and 216: We must be careful when we judge th
Page 217 and 218: matter of production, not of adequa
Page 219 and 220: differential and repeating element
Page 221 and 222: eminiscence but, on the contrary, t
Page 223 and 224: univocal being takes the form of it
Page 225 and 226: that relates it to extended space a
Page 227 and 228: argues “that the similarity betwe
Page 229 and 230: activity of the Cogito, namely reco
Page 231 and 232: ody Deleuze calls the dominant forc
Page 233 and 234: their reciprocal genesis derives”
Page 235 and 236: argues that “according to physici
Page 237 and 238: of becoming) and those who deny the
Page 239 and 240: order for the individual to repeat,
Page 241 and 242: Deleuze’s Nietzschean ethics Dele
Page 243 and 244: not a ‘mere feeling.’ It is a f
Page 245 and 246: these principles)” (Patton 288).
Page 247 and 248: ‘quasi-causes’ following laws w
Page 249 and 250: I have talked about ethics in terms
Page 251 and 252:
emergence of any new mode of existe
Page 253 and 254:
than that critical philosophy begin
Page 255 and 256:
itself in the name of truth means t
Page 257 and 258:
What is his type, his will to power
Page 259 and 260:
“Nietzsche presents the aim of hi
Page 261 and 262:
To think is to learn. To learn is t
Page 263 and 264:
Continental Philosophy. 10.1 (2006)
Page 265 and 266:
143-170. Ewing, A.C. A Short Commen
Page 267 and 268:
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kan
Page 269 and 270:
Protevi, John. “The Organism as t
Page 271:
Werkmesiter, W.H. “The Complement
show all

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?