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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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above mentioned, namely, that the categories are neither self-thought first principles a priori <strong>of</strong><br />

our knowledge nor derived from experience, but subjective dispositions <strong>of</strong> our thought,<br />

implanted in us from the first moment <strong>of</strong> our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that their<br />

employment is in complete harmony with the laws <strong>of</strong> nature in accordance with which<br />

experience proceeds—a kind <strong>of</strong> preformation-system <strong>of</strong> pure reason” (CPR B167). In other<br />

words, if knowledge corresponded to objects such knowledge would not be necessary. “There is<br />

this decisive objection against the suggested middle course, that the necessity <strong>of</strong> the categories,<br />

which belong to their very conception, would then have to be sacrificed” (CPR B168). Thus<br />

representational knowledge exists on the basis <strong>of</strong> the insurmountable opposition between itself<br />

and the object. “For if we were speaking <strong>of</strong> a thing in itself, we could indeed say that it exists in<br />

itself apart from relation to our senses and possible experience” (CPR B522/A494). For this<br />

reason, Kant argues, “we have no insight whatsoever into the inner [nature] <strong>of</strong> things” (CPR<br />

A277/B333). Lucy Allais acknowledges this point in “Kant’s One World: Interpreting<br />

Transcendental Idealism:” “we cannot know the intrinsic nature <strong>of</strong> things, even though the<br />

appearances <strong>of</strong> things are the way things, or the intrinsic natures <strong>of</strong> things, appear” (Allais<br />

678).Nevertheless, representational knowledge does attempt to surmount this insurmountable<br />

opposition. In “The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy,” George A. Schrader argues that “only<br />

if the thing in itself is also the thing which appears, is Kant’s position consistent and defensible”<br />

(Schrader 30).<br />

That we cannot know the thing itself does not mean that we cannot think it. “But our<br />

further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these<br />

objects [<strong>of</strong> experience] as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them<br />

as things in themselves” (CPR Bxxvi). In this sense, the thing in itself is in fact some kind <strong>of</strong><br />

61

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