stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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Difference and repetition Deleuze often suggests that philosophy is an ontology. One might think that for this reason Deleuze is a dogmatic philosopher, a metaphysician. Often, Deleuze himself seems to say as much. But I argue that this is not the case. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant talks about the object from the perspective of the Cogito which is to say that he talks about the appearance. But when Deleuze talks about difference he is no less critical than Kant. The only difference is in their respective starting points. In Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition James Williams writes that “the Deleuzian appeal to the transcendental is, thus, very different from the Kantian. It turns on the question where they begin, what they take as given…” (Williams 123). In fact, if the Copernican Counter-Revolution is to ground the Copernican Revolution, Deleuze must be a critical philosopher. In this regard it is important to note that Deleuze does not say that philosophy is an ontology without at the same time saying that being is univocal. “Philosophy merges with ontology, but ontology merges with the univocity of Being” (LS 179). But why is being univocal? The passive self does not arrive to being with a concept in hand. This means that the passive self does not confront an object but is rather immersed in it. In “Six Notes on the Percept” François Zourabichivili argues that “mind is the membrane of the external world, rather than an autonomous gaze directed towards it. Everyone may therefore say ‘I am the world, or a piece of the world’…” (Zourabichivili 197). Actually, to the extent that the passive self does not arrive with the concept in hand means that we cannot even talk about the object. Perhaps the most that we can say is that the passive self is immersed. But even this is saying too much. To the extent that the self is passive in other words that it does not arrive with the concept in hand means that this self is indistinguishable from its immersion, simply, that the passive self is its immersion. But even this extreme way of putting it also says too much. To the extent that the 175
passive self is to be immersed means that we cannot make any kind of distinction between it and its immersion. In other words, we cannot even talk about ‘immersion’ because immersion supposes a passive self that then immerses. What then are we to say? Rather than talk about the passive self and its immersion, the only thing that we can talk about is the univocal being. This is Deleuze’s first point. However, one need not stop at this level of analysis. While being is univocal, Deleuze argues, that does not mean that all beings are the same. “The univocity of Being does not mean that there is one and the same Being; on the contrary beings are multiple and different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they themselves are disjointed and divergent, membra disjuncta” (LS 179). Even though being is univocal, beings are different. And it is these differences among beings in the univocal being that suggest that being is not just univocal, but rather that this univocal being is itself difference. “With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference” (DR 39). Difference names the productive power of the univocal being to differentiate and multiply beings. One of these beings is the passive self. The self is not just immersed. If it was, it would not be possible to talk about it as passive. To say that the self is passive is to say that it does not arrive to being with a concept in hand. Still that the self does not arrive with the concept in hand does not mean that it does not do anything. It is only the kind of philosophy that thinks that the self is a self only to the extent that it is in possession of the concept that deems such a passive self a non-self. But Deleuze argues against this spontaneous notion of the self, the Cogito. For this reason, he also discredits its alternative whatever it may be. The self is still a self even though it is not in possession of the concept. Its passive nature is precisely what distinguishes it from the Cogito. Deleuze calls this passive nature of the self ‘repetition.’ Even though the self does not impose the concept onto being thus 176
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The Ethics of Kant’s Practice: Or
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Koje je bolje? Jeda
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PART II: Deleuze and the ethics of
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associates such an actualization wi
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ability to will. This is important.
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subject is already within that whic
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Nietzsche. In “Existing Not as a
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transcendental in ethics. (I do not
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instance, in The Science of Knowled
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concept. When we approach these dis
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What is a faculty? Empirical knowle
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the principle of their possibility
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elow one of the things that I will
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The activity of analyzing Kant anal
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object” (CPR A68/B93). That conce
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The activity of combining Kant does
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understand them. “But the combina
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The categories Concepts do not rest
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employed in determination of the ma
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therefore of the possibility of the
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producing the judgment that necessa
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to these and the intuition of them,
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concept of body does not occur, but
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Transcendental deduction The abilit
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deduction, such as we have been abl
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egins with the matter of experience
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abstract, namely, that the manifold
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Chapter 2: The thing in itself as t
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knowledge. I claim that representat
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The ability to reason The goal of t
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In the scientific method, reason do
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object that steht knowledge entgege
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The Bounds of Sense P.F. Strawson r
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appearance. “The distinction, whi
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objects in abstraction from this ab
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can never—at least not in the man
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eason. In fact, Kant thinks that th
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things in themselves. But what is t
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objective facts. It is as if they r
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object. “Although to the question
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cannot know freedom not so much bec
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presupposed prior to all appearance
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themselves are thinkers” (Langton
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For this reason, we must know abili
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Chapter 3: The actualization of fre
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absolute worth as ends in themselve
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happiness, in perfection, in moral
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5:90). In short, “in the present
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the uses of abilities in practice c
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important to acknowledge that for K
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desire, and where there are no mere
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in the determination of choice thro
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intervening feeling of pleasure or
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transcendental freedom is a problem
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character (which is no more than th
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place, contains nothing borrowed fr
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means that it cannot will. It must
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writes: “will is generally and us
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problem of freedom is as simple as
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The non-material objects of the wil
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Kant’s Theory of Freedom Allison
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freedom, reason gives to itself and
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Respect for humanity The form of th
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good is the object that reason in p
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Page 133 and 134: theoretical knowledge. In this sens
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Page 137 and 138: ecomes its own object, and is thus
Page 139 and 140: Kant’s due Fichte writes that “
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Page 143 and 144: PART II: The ethics of repetition
Page 145 and 146: something else, a kind of paradoxic
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Page 149 and 150: But this is not the only significan
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Page 157 and 158: eason would do anything but reason;
Page 159 and 160: disinterested, in other words, that
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Page 163 and 164: An interest of reason determines th
Page 165 and 166: faculties” (DI 64). For this reas
Page 167 and 168: forms. “In fact the imagination d
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Page 177 and 178: “The entire Kantian critique amou
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Page 183 and 184: demonstration of this power of diff
Page 185 and 186: Deleuze often says that difference
Page 187 and 188: of experience is at the same time t
Page 189 and 190: coexisting levels” (DR 84). That
Page 191 and 192: cannot be infinite. But how can tim
Page 193 and 194: to the same thing. In the second sy
Page 195 and 196: case the passive self passes from o
Page 197 and 198: efore or after something, the livin
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Page 211 and 212: The concept I have distinguished be
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Page 217 and 218: matter of production, not of adequa
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ody Deleuze calls the dominant forc
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their reciprocal genesis derives”
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argues that “according to physici
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of becoming) and those who deny the
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order for the individual to repeat,
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Deleuze’s Nietzschean ethics Dele
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not a ‘mere feeling.’ It is a f
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these principles)” (Patton 288).
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‘quasi-causes’ following laws w
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I have talked about ethics in terms
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emergence of any new mode of existe
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than that critical philosophy begin
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itself in the name of truth means t
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What is his type, his will to power
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“Nietzsche presents the aim of hi
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To think is to learn. To learn is t
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Continental Philosophy. 10.1 (2006)
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143-170. Ewing, A.C. A Short Commen
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kan
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Protevi, John. “The Organism as t
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Werkmesiter, W.H. “The Complement
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