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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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ability to will. This is important. It is also important to recognize that Kant defines the ability to<br />

will as the ability to desire. So we have this point. Ethics is about the actualization <strong>of</strong> the ability<br />

to desire. But what does this mean? It just means being able to want. Actually it means<br />

something even more specific than that. If actualization <strong>of</strong> ability is something concrete, that is,<br />

some kind <strong>of</strong> activity, then ethics just is wanting. This seems like a rather silly, primitive<br />

interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant. Nonetheless, it is, I argue, what Kant means. It is important to recognize<br />

that Kant thinks that such wanting is difficult to do. You do not want if some matter—and that<br />

can be any matter including what we take to be the universal moral value or even desire itself—<br />

determines your wanting. When that happens you give up your wanting for that matter. On the<br />

contrary, you want only when your wanting is pure, the pure will, when desire itself is the first<br />

moment <strong>of</strong> your activity. Kant argues that it is reason that opens me up to this desire. This is why<br />

Kant can use the words ‘reason’ and ‘the will’ interchangeably in his practical philosophy. In any<br />

case, I claim that Kant calls such a life that wants autonomy. To me it is clear that such a life is<br />

synonymous with experimentation, in other words, it is engaging people and situations for<br />

absolutely no reason at all not even that engagement itself. (In fact that may be the last obstacle<br />

<strong>of</strong> this Kantian ethics, to want to want).<br />

Here I hope that you see the connection to Deleuze’s notion <strong>of</strong> counter-actualization. Yes<br />

Deleuze talks about ethics as the counter-actualization <strong>of</strong> the transcendental, but thereby he does<br />

not mean the opposite <strong>of</strong> what I just described. It is not like he argues that ethics is about not<br />

wanting or about wanting some matter. He too means something like wanting that has no end or<br />

purpose not even that wanting itself. Still, I do not want to say that Deleuze just exactly repeats<br />

what Kant already says. He repeats with difference. Deleuze has a more complex and more vivid<br />

understanding <strong>of</strong> the transcendental. For him the transcendental does not just stand for desire<br />

4

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