stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

concept. When we approach these discussions directly, we cannot make sense of Kant’s claims.
We are always forced either to pick and choose or, on the other hand, to force an interpretation.
However, if we place these discussions in their proper context, in other words, if we understand
them from the point of view of the main goal of the Critique of Pure Reason, I show that we can
in fact understand them. This is the first advantage of the indirect approach to the thing in itself.
It makes sense of what seem to be contradictory and inconsistent statements. The second
advantage is different in character. When we approach the thing itself directly, we give a false
sense of the weight that this concept has in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Again, Kant does
not spend much time discussing this concept directly. In fact he spends much more time on other
issues such as for example on the Analogies of Experience. But I doubt that for that reason one
ought to conclude that the discussion of the Analogies of Experience is more important for
Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason than his discussion of the thing in itself. On the
other hand, when we approach the thing in itself indirectly, that is, when we allow it to arise in
the context of Kant’s account of knowledge, we restore the important role that this concept plays
in the Critique of Pure Reason and also in Kant’s critical philosophy itself.
My discussion of Kant’s account of knowledge focuses on the transcendental analytic,
specifically, on the analytic of concepts. In this sense, my discussion of Kant’s account of
knowledge is rather general. The reader will discover that I have very little if nothing to say
about the many nitty-gritty aspects of his account of knowledge. For example, I have absolutely
nothing to say about Kant’s discussion of the schematism. This is not to say that I think that
these aspects of his account of knowledge are unimportant or irrelevant. On the contrary, I think
they are. However, the reader will remember that my ultimate goal in tackling Kant’s account of
knowledge in the first place is to arrive at an interpretation of the thing in itself. For this reason, I
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