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Immanence” in Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture. Ed. Eleanor Kaufman. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota, 1998. Smith, D. W. “Deleuze, Hegel and the Post-Kantian Tradition.” Philosophy Today. 44 (2000): 119-131. Smith, D. W. “Deleuze and Derrida: Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought” in Between Deleuze and Derrida ed. Paul Patton and Jon Protevi. New York: Continuum, 2003. Smith, D.W. “Deleuze, Kant and the Theory of Immanent Ideas.” Deleuze and Philosophy. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. Smith, D. W. “Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics” Parrhesia. 2 (2007): 66-78. Smith, D. W. and Nathan Jun Eds. Deleuze and Ethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011. Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992. Strawson, P.F. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen, 1966. Van Cleve, James. Problems from Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Van Tuinen and Niamh McDonnell, Eds. Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. Voss, Daniela. “Maimon and Deleuze.” Parrhesia 11 (2011): 62-74. Walsh, W.H. Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975. Welchman, Alistair. “Kant’s Post-Critical Metaphysics.” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy. 2009: 25-54. 265
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The Ethics of Kant’s Practice: Or
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Koje je bolje? Jeda
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PART II: Deleuze and the ethics of
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associates such an actualization wi
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ability to will. This is important.
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subject is already within that whic
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Nietzsche. In “Existing Not as a
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transcendental in ethics. (I do not
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instance, in The Science of Knowled
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concept. When we approach these dis
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What is a faculty? Empirical knowle
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the principle of their possibility
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elow one of the things that I will
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The activity of analyzing Kant anal
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object” (CPR A68/B93). That conce
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The activity of combining Kant does
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understand them. “But the combina
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The categories Concepts do not rest
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employed in determination of the ma
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therefore of the possibility of the
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producing the judgment that necessa
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to these and the intuition of them,
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concept of body does not occur, but
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Transcendental deduction The abilit
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deduction, such as we have been abl
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egins with the matter of experience
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abstract, namely, that the manifold
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Chapter 2: The thing in itself as t
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knowledge. I claim that representat
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The ability to reason The goal of t
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In the scientific method, reason do
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object that steht knowledge entgege
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The Bounds of Sense P.F. Strawson r
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appearance. “The distinction, whi
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objects in abstraction from this ab
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can never—at least not in the man
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eason. In fact, Kant thinks that th
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things in themselves. But what is t
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objective facts. It is as if they r
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object. “Although to the question
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cannot know freedom not so much bec
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presupposed prior to all appearance
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themselves are thinkers” (Langton
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For this reason, we must know abili
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Chapter 3: The actualization of fre
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absolute worth as ends in themselve
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happiness, in perfection, in moral
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5:90). In short, “in the present
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the uses of abilities in practice c
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important to acknowledge that for K
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desire, and where there are no mere
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in the determination of choice thro
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intervening feeling of pleasure or
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transcendental freedom is a problem
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character (which is no more than th
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place, contains nothing borrowed fr
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means that it cannot will. It must
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writes: “will is generally and us
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problem of freedom is as simple as
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The non-material objects of the wil
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Kant’s Theory of Freedom Allison
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freedom, reason gives to itself and
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Respect for humanity The form of th
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good is the object that reason in p
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law alone must be viewed as the gro
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personal interests, and thereby fin
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theoretical knowledge. In this sens
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practical philosophy does not start
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ecomes its own object, and is thus
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Kant’s due Fichte writes that “
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positive modes of knowledge which b
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PART II: The ethics of repetition
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something else, a kind of paradoxic
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knowledge as a kind of third to the
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But this is not the only significan
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of these relations is what Deleuze
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are? They do so only by actually kn
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faculty of knowledge itself? Kant
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eason would do anything but reason;
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disinterested, in other words, that
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not legislate as determining judgme
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An interest of reason determines th
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faculties” (DI 64). For this reas
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forms. “In fact the imagination d
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they allow the understanding to exp
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capable of free spontaneous agreeme
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form of object which reflects the s
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is what it means to say that differ
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“The entire Kantian critique amou
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self also means that one must under
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passive self is to be immersed mean
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demonstration of this power of diff
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Deleuze often says that difference
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of experience is at the same time t
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coexisting levels” (DR 84). That
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cannot be infinite. But how can tim
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to the same thing. In the second sy
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case the passive self passes from o
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efore or after something, the livin
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domain that we have had to extend t
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contemplation, whether it is not in
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can in some sense live the being in
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with which it is invested” (DR 85
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and future are not distributed acco
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has been fractured, dissolved. But
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The concept I have distinguished be
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difference, that absolutely differe
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We must be careful when we judge th
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matter of production, not of adequa
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Page 227 and 228: argues “that the similarity betwe
Page 229 and 230: activity of the Cogito, namely reco
Page 231 and 232: ody Deleuze calls the dominant forc
Page 233 and 234: their reciprocal genesis derives”
Page 235 and 236: argues that “according to physici
Page 237 and 238: of becoming) and those who deny the
Page 239 and 240: order for the individual to repeat,
Page 241 and 242: Deleuze’s Nietzschean ethics Dele
Page 243 and 244: not a ‘mere feeling.’ It is a f
Page 245 and 246: these principles)” (Patton 288).
Page 247 and 248: ‘quasi-causes’ following laws w
Page 249 and 250: I have talked about ethics in terms
Page 251 and 252: emergence of any new mode of existe
Page 253 and 254: than that critical philosophy begin
Page 255 and 256: itself in the name of truth means t
Page 257 and 258: What is his type, his will to power
Page 259 and 260: “Nietzsche presents the aim of hi
Page 261 and 262: To think is to learn. To learn is t
Page 263 and 264: Continental Philosophy. 10.1 (2006)
Page 265 and 266: 143-170. Ewing, A.C. A Short Commen
Page 267 and 268: York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kan
Page 269: Protevi, John. “The Organism as t
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