stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

knowledge. I claim that representational knowledge of the transcendental subjects is its
transcendental objectification. But this is only the negative point. I also want to make a positive
one.
I argue that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not just understand knowledge in
terms of representation. Instead, he also understands knowledge as practical knowledge or
knowledge as actualization. In this case, knowledge takes the form that we are not necessarily
used to. In this case, to know just means to actualize. But what does one actualize? One does not
actualize those objects that one represents. In other words, one does not actualize appearances.
On the other hand, one does not also actualize der Gegenstand. Der Gegenstand is the
transcendental object that representational knowledge projects. Instead, there is only one thing
that one actualizes. One actualizes inherent possibilities. If one projects the transcendental
objects, one actualizes the transcendental subject. In this sense I argue, this other kind of
knowledge, in other words, knowledge as actualization justifies abilities, in other words, it
justifies the thing in itself in its second sense. This argument allows me to make a transition to
Kant’s ethics. The kind of knowledge that knows the thing in itself in the second sense that Kant
introduces in the Critique of Pure Reason is what Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason calls
freedom. I proceed to given an example of this knowledge. In other words, I develop Kant’s
ethics. I have argued above that we cannot study Kant’s ethics directly, that is, by looking at the
Critique of Practical Reason because we must first understand the concept of the thing in itself
that makes that work itself possible and that therefore we must begin with the Critique of Pure
Reason. Now a different truth presents itself. We can only understand the Critique of Practical
Reason from the point of view of the Critique of Pure Reason, but it is really the Critique of
Practical Reason that grounds the Critique of Pure Reason. In other words, knowledge as
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