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stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

stankovic, sasa thesis.pdf - Atrium - University of Guelph

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themselves are thinkers” (Langton 209). She elaborates on this point. “Kant thus thinks that the<br />

most fundamental existents are—in this sense—not physical…To go further, and say that the<br />

non-physical things are more basic and fundamental than the physical things, brings one perhaps<br />

a little closer to idealism. To go further still, and not only deny that the fundamental things are<br />

physical, but assert that they are mental in nature, would be to come much closer to<br />

idealism…Here we must record that Kant comes close to doing both <strong>of</strong> these” (Langton 207-8).<br />

Langton concludes that we cannot know things in themselves: “we have no knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />

intrinsic properties <strong>of</strong> things…There is indeed an entire aspect <strong>of</strong> the world that remains hidden<br />

from us” (Langton 12). In fact, this entire aspect <strong>of</strong> the world that remains hidden from us is once<br />

again us. Thus, Langton concludes, her interpretation “does make a metaphysician <strong>of</strong> a<br />

philosopher who is supposed to have abandoned metaphysics” (Langton 6).<br />

Representational self-knowledge is a torturous enterprise for a good reason. Every time<br />

we know some self in itself as the transcendental object we ask what self it is that does that<br />

knowing. And when we know that self in itself as the transcendental object we ask the same<br />

question and so on. In Problems from Kant James van Cleve asks the question: “but what about<br />

these minds or acts? Do they owe their existence to being apprehended?” (van Cleve 136). In this<br />

sense, representational self-knowledge always tries to get behind itself and it is precisely in this<br />

getting behind itself that it fails. There is always a remainder. But what is this remainder? In the<br />

Bounds <strong>of</strong> Sense P.F. Strawson distinguishes between the transcendental object that affects and<br />

the transcendental subject that is affected. “Within this [supersensible] sphere there obtains a<br />

certain complex relation (or a class <strong>of</strong> cases <strong>of</strong> this relation) which we can speak <strong>of</strong>, on the model<br />

<strong>of</strong> a causal relation, in terms <strong>of</strong> ‘affecting’ and ‘being affected by.’ Let us call it the A-relation”<br />

(Strawson 236). Thus the remainder is nothing other than die Vermögen, die Fähigkeiten, die<br />

80

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